This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-02-19 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Time and again, this Court held that denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Inherently weak, denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the appellant, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is not the case here. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the prosecution witness who testified on affirmative matters.[55] Moreover, there is a presumption that public officers, including the arresting officers, regularly perform their official duties.[56] In this case, the defense failed to overcome this presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence. Furthermore, this Court finds no ill motive that could be attributed to the police officers who had conducted the buy-bust operation. Even the allegation of the appellant that PO2 Martinez got angry with him when he failed to pinpoint the big time pusher cannot be considered as the ill motive in implicating the appellant on all the three charges against him for this is self-serving and uncorroborated. | |||||
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2013-01-30 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the accused, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on affirmative matters.[63] | |||||
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2012-08-23 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| The appellant's arguments are misplaced. The CA correctly ruled that "AAA" could not cry for help as she was intimidated and overpowered by her aggressors who threatened her with a sharp-bladed knife.[32] Besides, it is important to underscore that the proximity of an inhabited house to the place where the crime took place does not rule out the possibility of the commission of rape. We have previously held in People v. Mabonga[33] that: [I]t is a common judicial experience that 'the presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing their odious act. Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are several occupants and even in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping'. | |||||
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2008-11-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| It is well settled that proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape, neither is a medico-legal report indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, it being merely corroborative in nature.[55] More importantly, a freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape, and healed lacerations do not negate rape,[56] neither does the absence of spermatozoa negate rape.[57] In addition, absence of external signs of physical injuries does not cancel out the commission of rape, since proof of injuries is not an essential element of the crime.[58] It must be borne in mind that AAA has a mental capacity of a 4-5-year old. Most likely, she did not put up a resistance that could bring about physical injuries. Moreover, prosecution witness Dr. Eligio testified that AAA could have been "used" once or twice before in view of the presence of healed lacerations; and that if the penis is of normal size, subsequent intercourse would no longer cause lacerations. | |||||