This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-11-10 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| As regards to the alleged discrepancies in AAA's testimony, the statements in her complaint-affidavit, and her medical certificate, the same are not sufficient grounds for acquittal. It is doctrinally established that discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in her affidavit and those made by her on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit her, since ex parte affidavits tend to be incomplete and inaccurate. Hence, affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to declarations made in open court.[26] Moreover, the medical examination of the victim and the medical certificate are merely corroborative in character and are not indispensable elements in rape. What is important is that the testimony of the private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible.[27] | |||||
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2013-06-26 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present its case.[29] Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution.[30] In the present case, if petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability by establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the most prudent thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have compulsory process to secure Tan's attendance during the trial pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2)[31] of the Constitution. The records show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of these, no suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution. | |||||
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2010-06-29 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The award of PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and the same amount as moral damages for each count of qualified rape is in line with existing case law.[29] In rape cases, the concurrence, as here, of the victim's minority (under 18) and her relationship with the offender is a special qualifying circumstance for which the law prescribes the penalty of death under Art. 266-B[30] of the Revised Penal Code. While the new law prohibits the imposition of death, the penalty provided for a heinous crime is still death and qualified rape is still a heinous offense.[31] | |||||