This case has been cited 7 times or more.
|
2009-09-18 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| For even assuming arguendo that, as claimed by petitioner, his firearm was tucked inside his shirt, the plain view doctrine, of which the following requirements which must concur, viz: (1) the law enforcement officer has a prior justification for the intrusion, (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent, and, (3) the illegality of the evidence observed in plain view is apparent to the apprehending officer,[9] justified the intervention by the police officers in petitioner's and Rivas' heated arguments in the course of which they noticed the suspicious bulging object on petitioner's waist to draw them to check what it was. | |||||
|
2009-06-30 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities.[23] In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 42[24] specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would repel such inference.[25] | |||||
|
2008-04-30 |
TINGA, J, |
||||
| Likewise, Esternon's failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory of the same,[45] as required by Rule 126, Section 12[46] of the Rules of Court. People v. Go[47] characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by interested parties.[48] Thus, as a reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo[49] declared that the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary before police officers can retain the property seized and without it, they would have no authority to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another agency.[50] Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make the practice right because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law and it thereby defeats the very purpose for the enactment.[51] | |||||
|
2007-11-23 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to respondent. Section 4, Rule 126[29] of the Revised Criminal Procedure expressly mandates the delivery of the seized items to the judge who issued the search warrant to be kept in custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings against petitioner. The delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of said items by interested parties. The judge who issued the search warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the foregoing constitutes contempt of court.[30] | |||||
|
2005-06-28 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.[54] | |||||
|
2004-10-01 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
||||
| Courts are mandated to "put prosecution evidence under severe testing." Furthermore, the constitutional presumption of innocence requires them to take "a more than casual consideration" of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused.[24] The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[25] Considering the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of proof and overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence, it is not only appellant's right to be freed; it is, even more, this Court's constitutional duty to acquit her.[26] | |||||
|
2004-09-30 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Clearly, the search of the house must be done in the presence of the lawful occupants and it is only in the absence of the former that two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality may be called upon to witness the search. While appellant and the other occupants of the house were present during the search, they were not allowed to actually witness the search of the premises. They were in the words of the policemen "pressed," i.e., they were asked to stay put in the sala where they were seated while the simultaneous search was on-going in the upper and lower portions of the house.[39] They should be the ones that should have accompanied the policemen while the search was being done and not substituted by the barangay tanods in their stead. We held in People vs. Go:[40] | |||||