Lawyerly

GR No. 163361

2014-03-12

REYES, J.

The petitioners cannot solely rely on TCT No. T-9096 to assert ownership over the properties since it is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.[33] Ownership is not the same as a certificate of title.[34]

GR No. 174844

2013-03-20

VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN v. HEIRS OF SIMEON A.B. MAAMO

PEREZ, J.

As for the supposed fact that possession by tolerance was not among the issues simplified during the pre-trial of the case, suffice it to say that the same is subsumed in the second issue identified in the RTC's 29 November 1983 pre-trial order, i.e., "(w)hether or not [p]etitioners and the[ir] predecessors-in-interest had been in the actual, physical possession of the land in question in the concept [of] owners since 1906 up to the present."[64] Since Simplecio's possession of the subject parcel was by mere tolerance, we find that the CA correctly brushed aside petitioners' reliance on estoppel which cannot be sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference.[65] The same may be said of the CA's rejection of laches, an equitable doctrine the application of which is controlled by equitable considerations.[66] It operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.[67] Unfortunately for petitioners' cause, no such situation obtains in the case.

GR No. 175485

2011-07-27

CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RENATO L. MATEO

BERSAMIN, J.

Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not being a mode of acquiring ownership, does not create or vest title. [14] The Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property described therein. [15] In that sense, the issuance of the certificate of title to a particular person does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real property therein described with the person named therein, or that the registered owner may be holding the property in trust for another person. [16]

GR No. 173021

2010-10-20

DELFIN LAMSIS v. MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be dismissed for it is settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari.[65] There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Questions of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.[66] The instant case does not present a compelling reason to deviate from the foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent had proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners' claims. Their factual findings, supported as they are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect.

GR No. 173021

2010-10-20

DELFIN LAMSIS v. MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E

DEL CASTILLO, J.

The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one's claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of "officially establishing" one's land as an ancestral land.[69] Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership[70] upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership[71] that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since time immemorial. As aptly explained in another case: It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x x x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x[72] (Emphasis supplied)

GR No. 162033

2009-05-08

HEIRS OF TRANQUILINO LABISTE v. HEIRS OF JOSE LABISTE

TINGA, J.

It is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.[28] Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.[29] The equitable remedy of laches is, therefore, unavailing in this case.

GR No. 148846

2007-09-25

CECILIA AMODIA VDA. DE MELENCION v. CA

NACHURA, J.

AZNAR insists that since there was no Torrens title on file in 1964, insofar as the vendors, AZNAR, and the Register of Deeds are concerned, the subject property was unregistered at the time. The contention is untenable. The fact that the certificate of title over the registered land is lost does not convert it into unregistered land. After all, a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.[49] This Court agrees with the petitioners that AZNAR should have availed itself of the legal remedy of reconstitution of the lost certificate of title, instead of registration under Act 3344. We note that in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,[50] AZNAR, beset with the similar problem of a lost certificate of title over a registered land, sought the reconstitution thereof. It is unfortunate that, in the instant case, despite the sale of the subject property way back in 1964 and the existence of the remedy of reconstitution at that time, AZNAR opted to register the same under the improper registry (Act 3344) and allowed such status to lie undisturbed. From 1964 to 1989, AZNAR did not bother to have the lost title reconstituted or even have the subject property declared under its name for taxation purposes. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Laws must come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy.[51]

GR NO. 160711

2007-08-14

HEIRS OF MAXIMO LABANON v. HEIRS OF CONSTANCIO PROMULGATED: LABA

VELASCO, JR., J.

While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.[8]

GR NO. 168396

2006-06-22

MARCELINA V. ESPINO v. SPS. RICARDO VICENTE AND EMMA M. VICENTE

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Anent the weight accorded by the Court of Appeals to the tax declarations in the names of the respondents and the realty tax receipts, we hold that while it is true that tax declarations and tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, the same must be accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. By themselves, tax declarations and tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership.[21] We have reviewed the records of this case and we find that even at the time of the filing of the application by respondent Emma Vicente for the issuance of a free patent over the subject property, the person occupying the same was Emerenciana Espino. Ireneo Guballa, a Public Land Inspector/Investigator of the CENRO, and a disinterested third party, testified that Emerenciana and Marcelina were the occupants of the property prior to and at the time that he conducted the ocular inspection on the premises.[22]

GR NO. 157954

2006-03-24

PAZ GALVEZ v. CA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

On the matter of laches, it is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.[35] Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.[36] The equitable remedy of laches is, therefore, unavailing in this case.

GR No. 125758

2004-01-20

HEIRS OF SUSANA DE GUZMAN TUAZON v. CA

CALLEJO, SR., J.

The petitioners, likewise, asseverate that their petition in LRC Case No. 93-1310 involved the issuance, in lieu of the lost one, of the owner's copy of OCT No. 4331 which is governed by Section 109 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise, known as the "Property Registration Decree."[20] Hence, the Court of Appeals erred when it found that LRC Case No. 93-1310 was a petition for reconstitution which can be validly made only in case it is the original copy of the certificate of title with the Register of Deeds which is lost or destroyed, and the cause of action of which is based on Republic Act No. 26.[21] The argument, however, is non sequitur. Regardless of whether petitioners' cause of action in LRC Case No. 93-1310 is based on Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 or under Rep. Act No. 26, the same has no bearing on the petitioners' cause in this case. Precisely, in both species of reconstitution under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature of the action denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the action is merely to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred, and does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.[22] It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.[23] Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit, which is exactly what the private respondents did when they filed Civil Case No. 95-3577 before Branch 74. The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. Branch 74, therefore, committed no reversible error when it denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss the private respondents' petition in Civil Case No. 95-3577.

GR No. 136960

2003-12-08

IRON BULK SHIPPING PHILIPPINES v. REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FINALLY, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the amount of damages adjudicated by the Court below, which is at best speculative and not supported by damages.[5] The general rule is that only questions of law are entertained in petitions for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court's findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, are generally binding and conclusive upon this court.[6] There are recognized exceptions to this rule, among which are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.[7] Petitioner failed to demonstrate that its petition falls under any one of the above exceptions, except as to damages which will be discussed forthwith.

	GR No. 163361 2014-03-12	SPS. JOSE M. ESTACION v. SECRETARY REYES, J.
The petitioners cannot solely rely on TCT No. T-9096 to assert ownership over the properties since it is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.[33] Ownership is not the same as a certificate of title.[34]
	GR No. 174844 2013-03-20	VEVENCIA ECHIN PABALAN v. HEIRS OF SIMEON A.B. MAAMO PEREZ, J.
As for the supposed fact that possession by tolerance was not among the issues simplified during the pre-trial of the case, suffice it to say that the same is subsumed in the second issue identified in the RTC's 29 November 1983 pre-trial order, i.e., "(w)hether or not [p]etitioners and the[ir] predecessors-in-interest had been in the actual, physical possession of the land in question in the concept [of] owners since 1906 up to the present."[64] Since Simplecio's possession of the subject parcel was by mere tolerance, we find that the CA correctly brushed aside petitioners' reliance on estoppel which cannot be sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference.[65] The same may be said of the CA's rejection of laches, an equitable doctrine the application of which is controlled by equitable considerations.[66] It operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.[67] Unfortunately for petitioners' cause, no such situation obtains in the case.
	GR No. 175485 2011-07-27	CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RENATO L. MATEO BERSAMIN, J.
Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not being a mode of acquiring ownership, does not create or vest title. [14] The Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property described therein. [15] In that sense, the issuance of the certificate of title to a particular person does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real property therein described with the person named therein, or that the registered owner may be holding the property in trust for another person. [16]
	GR No. 173021 2010-10-20	DELFIN LAMSIS v. MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E DEL CASTILLO, J.
Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be dismissed for it is settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari.[65] There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Questions of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.[66] The instant case does not present a compelling reason to deviate from the foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent had proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners' claims. Their factual findings, supported as they are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect.
	GR No. 173021 2010-10-20	DELFIN LAMSIS v. MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E DEL CASTILLO, J.
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one's claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of "officially establishing" one's land as an ancestral land.[69] Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership[70] upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership[71] that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since time immemorial. As aptly explained in another case: It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x x x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x[72] (Emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 162033 2009-05-08	HEIRS OF TRANQUILINO LABISTE v. HEIRS OF JOSE LABISTE TINGA, J.
It is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.[28] Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.[29] The equitable remedy of laches is, therefore, unavailing in this case.
	GR No. 148846 2007-09-25	CECILIA AMODIA VDA. DE MELENCION v. CA NACHURA, J.
AZNAR insists that since there was no Torrens title on file in 1964, insofar as the vendors, AZNAR, and the Register of Deeds are concerned, the subject property was unregistered at the time. The contention is untenable. The fact that the certificate of title over the registered land is lost does not convert it into unregistered land. After all, a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.[49] This Court agrees with the petitioners that AZNAR should have availed itself of the legal remedy of reconstitution of the lost certificate of title, instead of registration under Act 3344. We note that in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,[50] AZNAR, beset with the similar problem of a lost certificate of title over a registered land, sought the reconstitution thereof. It is unfortunate that, in the instant case, despite the sale of the subject property way back in 1964 and the existence of the remedy of reconstitution at that time, AZNAR opted to register the same under the improper registry (Act 3344) and allowed such status to lie undisturbed. From 1964 to 1989, AZNAR did not bother to have the lost title reconstituted or even have the subject property declared under its name for taxation purposes. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Laws must come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy.[51]
	GR NO. 160711 2007-08-14	HEIRS OF MAXIMO LABANON v. HEIRS OF CONSTANCIO PROMULGATED: LABA VELASCO, JR., J.
While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.[8]
	GR NO. 168396 2006-06-22	MARCELINA V. ESPINO v. SPS. RICARDO VICENTE AND EMMA M. VICENTE YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Anent the weight accorded by the Court of Appeals to the tax declarations in the names of the respondents and the realty tax receipts, we hold that while it is true that tax declarations and tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, the same must be accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. By themselves, tax declarations and tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership.[21] We have reviewed the records of this case and we find that even at the time of the filing of the application by respondent Emma Vicente for the issuance of a free patent over the subject property, the person occupying the same was Emerenciana Espino. Ireneo Guballa, a Public Land Inspector/Investigator of the CENRO, and a disinterested third party, testified that Emerenciana and Marcelina were the occupants of the property prior to and at the time that he conducted the ocular inspection on the premises.[22]
	GR NO. 157954 2006-03-24	PAZ GALVEZ v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
On the matter of laches, it is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.[35] Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.[36] The equitable remedy of laches is, therefore, unavailing in this case.
	GR No. 125758 2004-01-20	HEIRS OF SUSANA DE GUZMAN TUAZON v. CA CALLEJO, SR., J.
The petitioners, likewise, asseverate that their petition in LRC Case No. 93-1310 involved the issuance, in lieu of the lost one, of the owner's copy of OCT No. 4331 which is governed by Section 109 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise, known as the "Property Registration Decree."[20] Hence, the Court of Appeals erred when it found that LRC Case No. 93-1310 was a petition for reconstitution which can be validly made only in case it is the original copy of the certificate of title with the Register of Deeds which is lost or destroyed, and the cause of action of which is based on Republic Act No. 26.[21] The argument, however, is non sequitur. Regardless of whether petitioners' cause of action in LRC Case No. 93-1310 is based on Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 or under Rep. Act No. 26, the same has no bearing on the petitioners' cause in this case. Precisely, in both species of reconstitution under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature of the action denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the action is merely to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred, and does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.[22] It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.[23] Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit, which is exactly what the private respondents did when they filed Civil Case No. 95-3577 before Branch 74. The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. Branch 74, therefore, committed no reversible error when it denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss the private respondents' petition in Civil Case No. 95-3577.
	GR No. 136960 2003-12-08	IRON BULK SHIPPING PHILIPPINES v. REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
FINALLY, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the amount of damages adjudicated by the Court below, which is at best speculative and not supported by damages.[5] The general rule is that only questions of law are entertained in petitions for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court's findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, are generally binding and conclusive upon this court.[6] There are recognized exceptions to this rule, among which are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.[7] Petitioner failed to demonstrate that its petition falls under any one of the above exceptions, except as to damages which will be discussed forthwith.

HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC v. ERMAC