This case has been cited 17 times or more.
|
2012-03-21 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| To successfully invoke self-defense, another requisite is that the means employed by the accused must be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted.[18] | |||||
|
2011-11-23 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| By pleading self-defense, an accused admits the killing,[16] and thereby assumes the burden to establish his plea of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, his conviction will follow from his admission of killing the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the State's evidence,[17] because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence of the crime, and establishing self-defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the elements of the offense itself.[18] | |||||
|
2011-01-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.[15] In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury.[16] It "presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely threatening and intimidating action."[17] It is present "only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life."[18] Such is absent in the instant case. | |||||
|
2010-11-17 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| The essential elements of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.[33] The person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof of proving all the elements.[34] More importantly, "to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack."[35] | |||||
|
2009-02-04 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| On the other hand, for evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[28] | |||||
|
2008-06-30 |
BRION,J. |
||||
| The third element - the reasonableness of the means to repel the aggression - is the critical element that the lower courts found lacking in the petitioner's case. Generally, reasonableness is a function of the nature or severity of the attack or aggression confronting the accused, the means employed to repel this attack, the surrounding circumstances of the attack such as its place and occasion, the weapons used, and the physical condition of the parties - which, when viewed as material considerations, must show rational equivalence between the attack and the defense.[43] In People v. Escarlos,[44] this Court held that the means employed by a person invoking self-defense must be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted. In Sienes v. People,[45] we considered the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim as important indicia material to a plea for self-defense. | |||||
|
2007-08-17 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| The automatic appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case for review,[62] as in this case. Thus, this Court is mandated to re-examine the vital facts established a quo and to properly apply the law thereto. The two courts below were both mistaken, as we note that AAA unqualifiedly testified on cross-examination to appellant's insertion of his tongue into her vagina, viz:Court: Q : On the third time you are [sic] allegedly raped, you said it happened at 3:30 in the morning of March 16, 1999. | |||||
|
2006-08-16 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.[13] | |||||
|
2006-08-16 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| In the instant case, the assertions that it was "quite probable" that Javier, during the course of the struggle for the firearm, "could have easily killed" the appellants are uncertain and speculative. There is aggression in contemplation of the law only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative.[14] | |||||
|
2006-08-16 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so insist, the imminence of the danger to their lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and grappled for the gun with the latter. After the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was no longer any unlawful aggression that would have necessitated the act of killing.[16] When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor.[17] When Javier had been caught in the struggle for the possession of the gun with appellant Dagani, the grave peril envisaged by appellant Santiano, which impelled him to fire at the victim, had then ceased to a reasonable extent,[18] and undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, even when the alleged unlawful aggression had already ceased.[19] | |||||
|
2006-08-16 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so insist, the imminence of the danger to their lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and grappled for the gun with the latter. After the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was no longer any unlawful aggression that would have necessitated the act of killing.[16] When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor.[17] When Javier had been caught in the struggle for the possession of the gun with appellant Dagani, the grave peril envisaged by appellant Santiano, which impelled him to fire at the victim, had then ceased to a reasonable extent,[18] and undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, even when the alleged unlawful aggression had already ceased.[19] | |||||
|
2006-08-16 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
||||
| Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so insist, the imminence of the danger to their lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down the victim and grappled for the gun with the latter. After the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was no longer any unlawful aggression that would have necessitated the act of killing.[16] When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor.[17] When Javier had been caught in the struggle for the possession of the gun with appellant Dagani, the grave peril envisaged by appellant Santiano, which impelled him to fire at the victim, had then ceased to a reasonable extent,[18] and undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on Javier, even when the alleged unlawful aggression had already ceased.[19] | |||||
|
2004-03-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[20] Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.[21] Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The person defending himself must have been attacked with actual physical force or with actual use of weapon.[22] In the case at bar, appellant miserably failed to prove the indispensable element of unlawful aggression. The testimony of Daniel Satuito that appellant was the unlawful aggressor and that the victim, although he was intensely arguing with the latter, did not or was not able | |||||
|
2004-02-23 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| Proof of moral damages was presented through the testimony of Lapidante's wife. The RTC's award of such damages herein is excessive, however, considering that it is not meant to enrich an injured party. [93] Hence, in Criminal Case No. 1083-M-98, the amount thereof should be reduced to P50,000. In the other two cases, there being no proof of moral damages, the award therefor is deleted. Moral damages cannot be granted in the absence of proof.[94] | |||||
|
2003-11-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| When an accused pleads self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime. Consequently, the burden of proving his guilt, which lies upon the prosecution, is shifted to him. He must prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[32] Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.[33] | |||||
|
2003-11-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| As regards his civil liability in Criminal Case No. 3597 for homicide, petitioner, in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00, should be further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Nestor Importado, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and temperate damages of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages. As testified by Merly Importado, the widow of the deceased, she was shocked and mentally tortured by the death of her husband.[46] Hence, the award of moral damages, which current jurisprudence set at P50,000.00, is proper. [47] To justify an award of actual damages, on the other hand, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can only be given to those that are supported by receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial of the victim.[48] Considering that the receipts presented by the prosecution do not show that the expenses stated therein were really incurred in connection with the death and burial of the victim, the claim for actual damages cannot be allowed. However, since it cannot be denied that the victim's heirs suffered pecuniary loss but the amount of which cannot be proved with certainty, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 may be awarded.[49] | |||||
|
2003-11-18 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| Finally, the trial court correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim. Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.[24] Likewise, the trial court was correct in not awarding actual, moral and exemplary damages because the prosecution failed to present competent evidence to prove the same. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss.[25] Further, in murder cases, moral damages cannot be granted in the absence of proof therefor[26] and exemplary damages without any aggravating circumstance.[27] | |||||