This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-10-19 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The CA fully debunked the argument on the exact date of the rape not being established by simply quoting from AAA's testimony that the rape had occurred on October 7, 1998.[18] We need to emphasize, however, that the date of the rape need not be precisely proved considering that date is not an element of rape.[19] | |||||
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2010-12-15 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| We agree with Flores that AAA's age was not proven with certainty. This Court has held that for minority to be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape, it must not only be alleged in the Information, but it must also be established with moral certainty.[17] Noting the divergent rulings on the proof required to establish the age of the victim in rape cases, this Court, in People v. Pruna,[18] has set out the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance: The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This Court has upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which merely alleged the month and year of its commission.[22] There is no cogent reason to deviate from these precedents, especially so when the prosecution has established the fact that the rape under Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097 was committed prior to the date of the filing of the information in the said case. Hence, the allegation in the information under Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097, which states that the rape was committed on or about November 1998, is sufficient to affirm the conviction of appellant in the said case. | |||||
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2007-11-22 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court. This Court has upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which merely alleged the month and year of its commission.[32] In People v. Magbanua,[33] we sustained the validity of the information for rape which merely alleged the year of its commission, thus:Although the information did not state with particularity the dates when the sexual attacks took place, we believe that the allegations therein that the acts were committed "on (sic) the year 1991 and the days thereafter" substantially apprised appellant of the crime he was charged with since all the essential elements of the crime of rape were stated in the information. As such, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of the right to be informed of the nature of the case filed against him. An information can withstand the test of judicial scrutiny as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. There is no cogent reason to deviate from these precedents especially so that all the essential elements of rape were also stated in the informations. Hence, the allegations in the informations which stated that the three incidents of rape were committed in the year 1996 and in May 1998 are sufficient to affirm the conviction of appellant in the instant case. | |||||
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2007-05-11 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Also, it cannot be seriously asserted that appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him when the prosecution failed to state the exact date of the commission of the offense. This Court has previously upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which merely alleged that a rape has been committed "sometime in the month of April 1993," for a rape which was committed in 1993; "on or about May 1998," for a rape committed sometime in the first week of May 1998; and "sometime in the month of September 1998,� for a rape committed on an evening in September 1998.[19] The allegation in the informations that the appellant committed the rape "sometime in June 1997"[20] and "sometime in April 1999"[21] was sufficient to inform appellant that he was being charged of qualified rape committed against his daughter. The allegation adequately afforded appellant an opportunity to prepare his defense. Thus, appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. | |||||