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PEOPLE v. NIÑO GARIN

This case has been cited 12 times or more.

2014-06-09
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In the same manner, treachery exists in Umawid's attack on Jeffrey, albeit the Court disagrees with the RTC and the CA's finding that Umawid employed means, methods, and forms that rendered Jeffrey incapable of raising a credible defense.[25] While it is true that treachery may also be appreciated even when the victim was warned of the danger to his person and what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate,[26] a review of the factual circumstances herein would reveal that it was not impossible for Jeffrey to put up a defense against Umawid's attacks. In fact, Jeffrey was sufficiently informed of Umawid's impending assault upon him as he saw the latter charging at him. Jeffrey even attempted to prevent Umawid from entering the house, albeit he was unsuccessful in doing so. Despite this, Jeffrey was still capable of mounting a defense against Umawid's attacks but it was simply unfortunate that he chose not to do so when he crouched and covered his head with his arms. Nevertheless, treachery may still be appreciated on account of Jeffrey's minority, considering that he was just 15 years of age when Umawid attacked him. Instructive on this point is the case of People v. Guzman,[27] where it was held that treachery attended the killing of a 17-year old victim due to his minority, viz:[28]
2012-08-22
PERALTA, J.
It is significant to point out, at this juncture, the well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law.[17] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.[18]  The Family Courts Act of 1997, which took effect on November 23, 1997.[19] Section 5 (a) of R.A. 8369 clearly provides that Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense. In the present case, there is no dispute that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense on June 2, 2001, private respondent, who is also the private complainant, was a minor. Hence, the case falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts.
2012-01-18
PEREZ, J.
As to whether the circumstance of treachery can qualify the killing to murder, the fact being that it was not expressly stated as such in the information, this Court has long clarified that "qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as 'qualifying' or 'qualified by' to properly qualify an offense."[41]
2011-07-06
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milan's act of closing the door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush.  The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to defend themselves.  Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate. [48]
2010-08-09
PEREZ, J.
The records also failed to show that AAA was prompted by ill motive in imputing such a grave offense against the appellant.  The absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify against the appellant strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.[47]  The claim of the appellant that his remark on AAA's mother, that since she was already a widow she should already get married, could possibly trigger the filing of this case against him is highly implausible.  As the trial court had stated, it is quite unbelievable that BBB's anger could have been triggered by such an innocuous joke to the extent of allowing the examination of AAA's private parts and subjecting AAA to the humiliation of declaring in open court the sexual molestation she underwent in the hands of the appellant.  Besides, no mother in her right mind would possibly stoop so low as to subject her daughter to the hardships and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt feelings.  It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject her daughter to embarrassment and even stigma.  It is hard to believe that a mother would sacrifice her own daughter and present her to be the subject of a public trial if she, in fact, has not been motivated by an honest desire to have the culprit punished.[48]
2009-06-05
NACHURA, J.
As to the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon, we sustain the CA's conclusion that the Information explicitly contained such allegation. There is no need for the allegation to be preceded by the words "qualifying/aggravating, qualifying, or qualified by" in order that such circumstance may be appreciated as such,[23] more so when it is the law itself which provides for the qualification of the crime.
2009-04-16
CORONA, J.
Lastly, since the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, his heirs are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.[13]
2008-12-10
NACHURA, J.
Second, whether appellant was correctly convicted of murder. Murder is committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246[36] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), kills another, if the killing is committed with treachery.[37] There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[38] Hence, for treachery to be appreciated, two conditions must be met, to wit: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) the offender's deliberate or conscious choice of means, method or manner of execution.[39]
2008-04-30
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
However, in the case of People v. Dela Cruz, it was held that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount[s] to less than P25,000, as in the present case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount.  This Court ratiocinated that it was anomalous and unfair that the heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages amounting to less than P25,000 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000 temperate damages.[27]
2007-07-12
NACHURA, J.
In this case, Cenahonon's version that he was forced to take care of the kidnap victim is simply unbelievable. For testimony to be believed, it should not only come from a credible witness but must also be credible in itself.[44] It would be inconceivable that kidnappers would entrust the performance of an essential and sensitive phase of their well-planned scheme to people not in collaboration with them, and who had no knowledge whatsoever of the details of their reprehensible plan.[45] Cenahonon's narrative even strengthens the prosecution's case, as it partakes of an admission that he participated in depriving the child of his liberty.
2007-06-07
QUISUMBING, J.
Appellant further contends that the informations[48] filed against him failed to allege treachery with specificity in order to qualify the killing to murder. Appellant's contention is disingenuous, to say the least. The informations sufficiently apprised appellant of the nature of the charges against him, i.e., that treachery, evident premeditation and dwelling attended the killing of Juliana, and the attack on Pelagio. It is not the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category.[49]
2005-03-31
QUISUMBING, J.
Similarly, several portions of Magno's testimony are unworthy of belief.  There seems to be no explanation as to why appellants ignored Magno and did not chase him[42] considering that he was only five feet away when he allegedly got an unobstructed view of appellants murdering the spouses.  Likewise, it makes no sense why, if it were true that he was running away for fear that appellants might also attack him, Magno chose to run only a short distance of only 50 meters, and while still unsure that appellants did in fact not run after him, Magno took the time to stop by Alexander Ebias's house, called out to Alexander, asked for some dried coconut leaves, and made a torch to light his path.  Magno's actions were certainly not the actions of someone seeking to avoid peril to his life.  The lighted torch and the noise he made calling out to Alexander would have revealed his location to the very people he said he was running from.  Magno's claim that he intended to go to the authorities and report that he saw appellants kill the spouses is far from credible, considering that he did not do so, even for the sake of exonerating himself right away when members of the Philippine Army arrested him for questioning.  Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.[43]