This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2007-03-02 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| We reiterate that a petition for annulment of judment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court may be availed of against final judgments and orders rendered by either RTCs in civil actions[20] or Municipal Trial Courts[21] (MTCs).[22] Final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals such as the National Labor Relations Commission,[23] the Ombudsman,[24] the Civil Service Commission,[25] and the OP[26] are beyond the reach of a petition for annulment under Rule 47. An order of the DAR Secretary issued in the exercise of his quasi-judicial powers is also outside its scope. Justice Jose C. Vitug, in Macalalag v. Ombudsman,[27] explained the rationale behind the limited application of Rule 47, to wit:The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. There must then be a law expressly granting such right. This legal axiom is also applicable and even more true in actions for annulment of judgments which is an exception to the rule on finality of judgments. [28] | |||||
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2007-02-06 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| This brings to fore the issue of whether the petition for annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA. As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It does not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano,[30] the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts." This was reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals,[31] where the Court ruled that that the CA is without jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of judgment of a final decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission. | |||||
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2005-09-26 |
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| The Court does not agree with respondent bank that its former counsel's mishandling of the case amounts to extrinsic fraud. After all, a client is bound by the negligence or mistake of his counsel.[25] While indeed there are cases when the Court declared that gross or reckless negligence of counsel amounts to extrinsic fraud, but this is the exception rather than the general rule. Not all negligence of counsel qualifies as extrinsic fraud, and each case must be considered under its own set of particular circumstances in ascertaining whether a counsel's negligence may provide sufficient basis to annul an otherwise final and executory judgment. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. vs. Semillano,[26] the Court stated:As a general rule, the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client, for otherwise there would never be an end to a suit so long as a new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the former counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. | |||||
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2004-11-10 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| It has been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration of justice. It has also been described as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[49] The test in determining the presence of this pernicious practice is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of: (a) parties; (b) rights or causes of action; and (c) reliefs sought.[50] | |||||