This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2012-10-03 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| The test of incompatibility is whether the two obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.[27] | |||||
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2012-06-27 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| To be clear, novation is not presumed. This means that the parties to a contract should expressly agree to abrogate the old contract in favor of a new one. In the absence of the express agreement, the old and the new obligations must be incompatible on every point.[20] According to California Bus Lines, Inc. v. State Investment House, Inc.:[21] | |||||
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2011-05-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, "[a] compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Like any other contract, an extrajudicial compromise agreement is not excepted from rules and principles of a contract. It is a consensual contract, perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.[76] Judicial approval is not required for its perfection.[77] A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata[78] and this holds true even if the agreement has not been judicially approved.[79] In addition, as a binding contract, a compromise agreement determines the rights and obligations of only the parties to it.[80] | |||||
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2009-05-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The test of incompatibility is whether the two obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.[29] | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| As to the issue of novation raised by petitioner, we are not persuaded by the latter's theory that the acceptance of rental payments by respondents pending the final determination of the instant petition amounts to a novation of the decision of the CA ordering petitioner to vacate the subject leased premises. In the first place, there is nothing to novate because as petitioner himself pounds on, the judgment to vacate has not yet become final. Furthermore, it bears stressing that novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express agreement of the parties, or by acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken.[40] In the present case, no intent to novate can be gleaned from the parties' actuations as they entered into the subsequent lease contracts with the qualification that the instant petition is pending before this Court. Hence, the final outcome of the judgment in this case will only operate as a resolutory condition to the existing contract between the parties as regards the leased premises. | |||||
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2008-11-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In so ruling, however, the Court does not go so far as to grant petitioners' claim for moral damages. A wrongful attachment may give rise to liability for moral damages but evidence must be adduced not only of the torment and humiliation brought upon the defendant by the attaching party but also of the latter's bad faith or malice in causing the wrongful attachment,[64] such as evidence that the latter deliberately made false statements in its application for attachment.[65] Absent such evidence of malice, the attaching party cannot be held liable for moral damages.[66] | |||||
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2006-04-19 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Under the Kasunduan, respondent was required to remit P550.00 daily to petitioner, an amount which represented the boundary of petitioner as well as respondent's partial payment (hulog) of the purchase price of the jeepney. Respondent was entitled to keep the excess of his daily earnings as his daily wage. Thus, the daily remittances also had a dual purpose: that of petitioner's boundary and respondent's partial payment (hulog) for the vehicle. This dual purpose was expressly stated in the Kasunduan. The well-settled rule is that an obligation is not novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old one, changes only the terms of payment, and adds other obligations not incompatible with the old provisions or where the new contract merely supplements the previous one. [47]The two obligations of the respondent to remit to petitioner the boundary-hulog can stand together. | |||||
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2005-04-26 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unmistakable. The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is a necessary element of novation, which may be effected either expressly or impliedly. The term "expressly" means that the contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that their object in executing the new contract is to extinguish the old one. Upon the other hand, no specific form is required for an implied novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be an incompatibility between the two contracts. While there is really no hard and fast rule to determine what might constitute to be a sufficient change that can bring about novation, the touchstone for contrariety, however, would be an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new obligations.[27] | |||||
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2004-09-20 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Second, there is no novation to speak of in the instant case. A novation is the substitution of a new contract, debt, or obligation for an existing one between the same or different parties.[17] Novation is never presumed.[18] In order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one.[19] It must be shown that all the parties consented to the substitution, resulting in the extinction of the old obligation and the creation of a valid new one.[20] Here, the parties did not enter into a new contract in order to supersede or supplant their original Sub-Contract. They merely made an arrangement wherein respondent would pay petitioner the settlement amount to enable it to continue the work, thus avoiding eventual delay in its completion. This was to insure that no damage would be caused to ABS-CBN. Evidently, the compromise agreement entered into by the parties co-exists with their original Sub-Contract and is a step to avoid litigation. | |||||