This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2012-11-13 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
||||
| Accordingly, there no longer exists an actual controversy between the parties and resolving the merits of this case would no longer serve any useful purpose. As we held in Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[22] | |||||
|
2009-07-30 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.[4] | |||||
|
2008-02-15 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
||||
| Moreover, following Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[18] a subsequent disqualification of Puno will not entitle petitioner, the candidate who received the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. It has long been settled in our jurisprudence, as early as 1912, that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected. The second placer is just that, a second placer he lost in the elections and was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters.[19] | |||||
|
2005-03-18 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| The Second Amended Criminal Complaint has rendered moot and academic the petition for Certiorari.[13] We agree with the RTC. The filing of the second amended criminal complaint superseded[14] the amended criminal complaint[15] and rendered moot and academic the petition for certiorari, which assailed the order of the RTC denying her motion to quash the amended criminal complaint on the ground that the said complaint did not charge a violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and as such, there was no probable cause for trial. The second amended criminal complaint was deemed filed with the MTCC on December 12, 2001. It is of no moment that it had not yet determined the presence of probable cause to hold the accused for trial and issue a warrant of arrest or summons or to dismiss the case. What was before the MTCC was the second amended criminal complaint which contained all the essential elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and the certification of the public prosecutor under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[16] The public prosecutor appears to have personally examined the private complainant on his affidavit and was satisfied that the latter voluntarily executed and understood the same. The RTC, therefore, had no alternative but to dismiss the petition for certiorari. As this Court held in Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[17] It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.[18] The ruling of this Court in Guillen v. Nicolas,[19] has no relevance in this case. In that case, the Court ruled that the ordinary procedure, not the summary procedure, applies in a case where a criminal complaint is filed with the MTCC, which has original jurisdiction over the offense charged. | |||||