This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2012-12-03 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| 'Interest' within the meaning of the rules means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A real party-in-interest is one who has a legal right. x x x The action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced. x x x[44] | |||||
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2007-07-31 |
TINGA, J. |
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| "Interest" within the meaning of the rules means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A real party in interest is one who has a legal right. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract. The action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.[23] | |||||
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2005-11-11 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed an Agreement on June 5, 1999, which was approved by the Lupon. Respondent Josephine Pablo did not repudiate the agreement; hence, such agreement of the parties settling the case had the force and effect of a final judgment. As the Court declared in Vidal v. Escueta,[30] the settlement of the parties may be enforced by the Lupon, through the punong barangay, within six months; and if the settlement is not enforced after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced by an action in the proper city or municipal court, as provided in Section 417 of the Local Government Code:We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated to transmit the settlement to the appropriate city or municipal court within the time frame under Section 418 of the LGC and to furnish the parties and the Lupon Chairman with copies thereof. The amicable settlement which is not repudiated within the period therefor may be enforced by execution by the Lupon through the Punong Barangay within a time line of six months, and if the settlement is not so enforced by the Lupon after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced only by an action in the proper city or municipal court as provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of 1991, as amended, which reads: | |||||
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2005-09-30 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| It is elementary that it is only in the name of a real party-in-interest that a civil suit may be prosecuted. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[16] One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action.[17] To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.[18] Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract.[19] | |||||
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2005-09-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The Rules clearly provide that non-compliance with any of the requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. If we apply the Rules strictly, we cannot fault the Court of Appeals for dismissing Security Bank's petition. The Court of Appeals merely followed the Rules. However, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction this Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits based on the evidence presented by the parties.[17] Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice.[18] Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve the substantial issues raised by the parties.[19] | |||||
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2005-06-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension of the rules. What is subject of the appeal is only a question of law, involving the issue of forum-shopping, and not a factual matter involving the merits of each party's respective claims and defenses relating to the enforcement of the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an option to purchase the subject property. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities.[20] Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[21] | |||||
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2005-06-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Appeals merely followed the Rules. However, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction this Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits based on the evidence presented by the parties.[17] Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice.[18] Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve the substantial issues raised by the parties.[19] The material dates required to be stated in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are: the date of receipt of the notice of the judgment or final order or resolution; the date of filing of the motion for new trial or for reconsideration; and the date of receipt of the notice of denial of the motion.[20] Contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, Security Bank correctly asserted that page 13 of its petition states the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration on 23 February 1999, or thirteen days after the receipt of the Order.[21] The petition | |||||
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2005-03-18 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| P.D. No. 1517, which took effect on June 11, 1978, seeks to protect the rights of bona-fide tenants in urban lands by prohibiting their ejectment therefrom under certain conditions, and by according them preferential right to purchase the land occupied by them.[43] Section 6 of the law provides: Section 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree. Thus, only legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years, are given the right of first refusal to purchase the land within a reasonable time.[44] Moreover, before a pre-emptive right under P.D. No. 1517 can be exercised, the disputed land should be situated in an area declared to be both an APD and a ULRZ.[45] Proclamation No. 1967, issued on May 14, 1980, identified the 244 sites of APD and within the Metropolitan Manila area.[46] | |||||
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2004-10-22 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| However, Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure also provides that rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Indeed, rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice.[10] This Court has ruled against the dismissal of appeals based solely on technicalities in several cases, especially when the appellant had substantially complied with the formal requirements.[11] | |||||