This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2013-10-08 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Like all laws and regulations, RR 16-2005 applies prospectively and not retroactively to the date of the effectivity of the 1997 Tax Code. As this Court explained in BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[23] the rule on prospectivity of laws encompasses revenue regulations implementing the 1997 NIRC:The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to be legislative in nature. Section 1 of Revenue Regulation 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277 (now Section 244) is an express grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. In Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court recognized that the application of Section 277 calls for none other than the exercise of quasi-legislative or rule-making authority. Verily, it cannot be disputed that Revenue Regulation 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of Finance, thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as alleged by BLC. | |||||
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2012-09-19 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| GF itself is adamant that it does not seek the retroactive application of Revenue Regulations No. 15-2002.[17] Even if it were inclined to do so, it cannot insist on the application of the said rules because tax laws, including rules and regulations, operate prospectively unless otherwise legislatively intended by express terms or by necessary implication.[18] Although GF does not dispute that Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 was the applicable rule covering the taxable period involved, it puts in issue the wisdom of the said rule as it pertains to the definition of gross receipts. | |||||
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2009-07-07 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is significant to note that RMC No. 66-2003 was issued only on 14 October 2003, more than two years after FY 2000-2001 of PAL ended on 31 March 2001. This violates the well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication.[28] | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| Any doubt on the matter has been resolved by the Court's ruling in BPI Leasing Corp. v. Court of Appeals[17] where this Court emphasized that the lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the corporation.[18] Specific authorization, the Court held, could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification, to make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.[19] | |||||
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2007-07-27 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| It is possible for a substantive matter to be nonetheless embodied in a rule of procedure, and to a certain extent, Rule 67 does contain matters of substance. Yet the absorption of the substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the substantive right from being superseded or amended by statute, for the creation of property rights is a matter for the legislature to enact on, and not for the courts to decide upon. Indeed, if the position of the Government is sustained, it could very well lead to the absurd situation wherein the judicial branch of government may shield laws with the veneer of irrepealability simply by absorbing the provisions of law into the rules of procedure. When the 1987 Constitution restored to the judicial branch of government the sole prerogative to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it should be understood that such rules necessarily pertain to points of procedure, and not points of substantive law. It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication[24] because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested.[25] This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward). | |||||
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2007-07-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| A board resolution purporting to authorize a person to sign documents in behalf of the corporation must explicitly vest such authority. BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals[10] so instructs:Corporations have no powers except those expressly conferred upon them by the Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence. These powers are exercised through their board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Hence, physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate bylaws or by specific act of the board of directors. | |||||
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2006-06-22 |
CORONA, J. |
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| A corporation may exercise the powers expressly conferred upon it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence through its board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents.[9] Hence, physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of the board of directors.[10] In the absence of authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the officers of the corporation, can bind the corporation.[11] | |||||
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2004-11-10 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| In this connection, the lawyer must be "specifically authorized" in order to validly sign the certification.[53] | |||||