Lawyerly

GR No. 191805

2013-04-16

IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

SERENO, C.J.

The purported unwillingness of the petitioner to appear or participate at this stage of the proceedings due to security reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any case, the issue of the existence of criminal, civil, or administrative liability which may be imputed to the respondents is not the province of amparo proceedings -- rather, the writ serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.[5] In this case then, the thrust of ensuring that investigations are conducted and the rights to life, liberty, and security of the petitioner, remains.

GR No. 189689

2012-11-13

IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA: LILIBETH O. LADAGA v. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings.[36] It plays the preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of the perpetrators.[37] In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[38] the Court has previously held that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Hence, every petition for the issuance of the writ is required to be supported by justifying allegations of fact on the following matters: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

GR Nos. 184379-80

2012-04-24

RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA v. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO

SERENO, J.

The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to protect the people's right to life, liberty and security.[62] Having been originally intended as a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.[63]

GR No. 191805

2011-11-15

IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

SERENO, J.

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.[61] It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.[62] Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.[63] It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.[64]

GR Nos. 184461-62

2011-05-31

LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC v. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN

CARPIO MORALES, J.

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[33] an original petition for Prohibition, Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order which was treated as a petition under the Amparo Rule, said Rule having taken effect during the pendency of the petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and veracity of the personal account of Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and Merino while on detention. Thus it held: We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:

GR No. 189155

2010-09-07

IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

PEREZ, J.

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.[106] While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired--the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.[107] The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:[108]

GR No. 183871

2010-02-18

LOURDES D. RUBRICO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

VELASCO JR., J.

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.[21] Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents' criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo),[22] the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."[23] Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis: It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].

GR No. 183871

2010-02-18

LOURDES D. RUBRICO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

VELASCO JR., J.

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."[14] In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,[15] foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators[16] (as opposed to crimes he ordered).

GR No. 183871

2010-02-18

LOURDES D. RUBRICO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

VELASCO JR., J.

Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations' truth. And by way of general affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.[4]

GR No. 182498

2010-02-16

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON v. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS

BRION, J.

First, the petitioners argue that there was no sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasim's disclosure unequivocally points to some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the petitioners contend that this Court erred in unduly relying on the raw information given to Col. Kasim by a personal intelligence "asset" without any other evidence to support it. The petitioners also point out that the Court misapplied its cited cases (Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,[7] Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,[8] and Timurtas v. Turkey[9]) to support its December 3, 2009 decision; in those cases, more than one circumstance pointed to the complicity of the government and its agents. The petitioners emphasize that in the present case, the respondent only presented a "token piece of evidence" that points to Col. Kasim as the source of information that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for having been suspected as a "terrorist supporter." This, according to the petitioners, cannot be equated to the substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[10]

GR No. 182161

2009-12-03

REVEREND FATHER ROBERT P. REYES v. CA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[11] made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof, thus: x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."[12]

GR No. 182498

2009-12-03

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON v. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS

BRION, J.

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[139] this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one's right by the government, held that: The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:

GR No. 182165

2009-11-25

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO v. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo[14] teaches:As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.[15] (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

	GR No. 191805 2013-04-16	IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO SERENO, C.J.
The purported unwillingness of the petitioner to appear or participate at this stage of the proceedings due to security reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any case, the issue of the existence of criminal, civil, or administrative liability which may be imputed to the respondents is not the province of amparo proceedings -- rather, the writ serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.[5] In this case then, the thrust of ensuring that investigations are conducted and the rights to life, liberty, and security of the petitioner, remains.
	GR No. 189689 2012-11-13	IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA: LILIBETH O. LADAGA v. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings.[36] It plays the preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of the perpetrators.[37] In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[38] the Court has previously held that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Hence, every petition for the issuance of the writ is required to be supported by justifying allegations of fact on the following matters: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
	GR Nos. 184379-80 2012-04-24	RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA v. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO SERENO, J.
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to protect the people's right to life, liberty and security.[62] Having been originally intended as a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.[63]
	GR No. 191805 2011-11-15	IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO SERENO, J.
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.[61] It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.[62] Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.[63] It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.[64]
	GR Nos. 184461-62 2011-05-31	LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC v. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN CARPIO MORALES, J.
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[33] an original petition for Prohibition, Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order which was treated as a petition under the Amparo Rule, said Rule having taken effect during the pendency of the petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and veracity of the personal account of Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and Merino while on detention. Thus it held: We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:
	GR No. 189155 2010-09-07	IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO PEREZ, J.
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.[106] While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired--the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.[107] The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:[108]
	GR No. 183871 2010-02-18	LOURDES D. RUBRICO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VELASCO JR., J.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.[21] Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents' criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo),[22] the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."[23] Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis: It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].
	GR No. 183871 2010-02-18	LOURDES D. RUBRICO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VELASCO JR., J.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."[14] In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,[15] foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators[16] (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
	GR No. 183871 2010-02-18	LOURDES D. RUBRICO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VELASCO JR., J.
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations' truth. And by way of general affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.[4]
	GR No. 182498 2010-02-16	GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON v. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS BRION, J.
First, the petitioners argue that there was no sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasim's disclosure unequivocally points to some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the petitioners contend that this Court erred in unduly relying on the raw information given to Col. Kasim by a personal intelligence "asset" without any other evidence to support it. The petitioners also point out that the Court misapplied its cited cases (Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,[7] Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,[8] and Timurtas v. Turkey[9]) to support its December 3, 2009 decision; in those cases, more than one circumstance pointed to the complicity of the government and its agents. The petitioners emphasize that in the present case, the respondent only presented a "token piece of evidence" that points to Col. Kasim as the source of information that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for having been suspected as a "terrorist supporter." This, according to the petitioners, cannot be equated to the substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[10]
	GR No. 182161 2009-12-03	REVEREND FATHER ROBERT P. REYES v. CA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[11] made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof, thus: x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."[12]
	GR No. 182498 2009-12-03	GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON v. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS BRION, J.
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[139] this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one's right by the government, held that: The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
	GR No. 182165 2009-11-25	P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO v. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ CARPIO MORALES, J.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo[14] teaches:As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.[15] (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE v. RAYMOND MANALO