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CRESENCIANO DUREMDES v. AGUSTIN DUREMDES

This case has been cited 12 times or more.

2014-06-09
PERALTA, J.
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;  (2)  when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence or record.[20]
2010-08-18
PERALTA, J.
The rules of procedure must be faithfully followed, except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply within the prescribed procedure.[22] Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[23]
2010-02-04
PERALTA, J.
While there are instances where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, the long line of decisions denying the special civil action for certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or in instances where the appeal period had lapsed, far outnumber the instances where certiorari was given due course.[24] The few significant exceptions are: (1) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (2) when the broader interests of justice so require; (3) when the writs issued are null; (4) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority,[25] which we find to be not present in this case. Notably, petitioner did not even fail to advance an explanation why appeal was not availed of, nor was there any showing that the issue raised in the petition for certiorari could not be raised on appeal. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[26]
2007-12-14
TINGA, J,
Will it be necessary to remand these cases to the trial courts to determine which of the Certificates of Title are valid? If so, which trial court?[25] A crucial fact emerged during the oral arguments. The Republic, through the Solicitor General,[26] strenuously argued that contrary to the supposition reflected in the Advisory, there was, in fact, only one OCT No. 994. x x x In this particular case, it appears that on December 3, 1912, the Court of Land Registration, the Judge Norberto Romualdez presiding, acting on Land Registration Case No. 4429 rendered judgment ordering the GLRO to issue a decree. Pursuant to this order, the GLRO prepared Decree No. 36455 and issued the same on April 19, 1917 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, at Manila, Philippines. It may be observed that at the face of the OCT 994 which was then on file at the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan and now kept in the LRA, the following entry can be seen. Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal this 3rd day of May 1917 at 7:30 a.m. Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of transcription of the decree into the Original Certificate of Title. It appears that the transcription of the decree was done on the date it was received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917. There is no other date to speak of. In the records of the Land Registration Authority, there is only one OCT 994, on its face appears the date of transcript, May 3, 1917. The validity then of all subsequent titles tracing their origin from OCT 994 should be tested in the light of these set of facts. x x x[27] On the other hand, the counsel for CLT stated during the same oral argument that he had seen a photocopy of an OCT No. 994 that was dated 19 April 1917,[28] and manifested that he could attach the same to CLT's memorandum.[29] At the same time, on even date, the Court directed the Solicitor General and counsel for CLT to submit to the Court "certified true copies of the Original Certificate of Title No. 994 dated May 3 1917 and April 19, 1917, respectively, on or before Friday, August 4, 2006."[30]
2006-06-16
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws x x x. (Emphasis added) We clarified, however, in Isidro v. Court of Appeals[24] that: x x x a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute, upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction.  x x x  The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. We also held in Duremdes v. Duremdes[25] that: x x x  For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) [T]hat the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In the case before us, petitioner does not have tenurial arrangement of any kind with Beliran or Diolasa, and the necessary elements enumerated in Duremdes v. Duremdes are wanting as well.  There being no agrarian dispute between the parties, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the case. 
2006-02-06
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
[19] G.R. No. 138256, November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 684.
2005-11-29
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Here, the paramount question being raised in the three petitions is whether TCT No. 15169 issued in the name of Jose B. Dimson and TCT No. 177013 issued in the name of CLT are valid.   Undoubtedly, such issue is a pure question of fact a matter beyond our power to determine.   Where, as here, the findings of fact of the trial courts are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are accorded the highest degree of respect and, generally, will not be disturbed on appeal.   Such findings are binding and conclusive on this Court.[35]
2005-04-29
AZCUNA, J.
a)   The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws. . . . The issue is not new.  It was held in Duremdes v. Duremdes[8] that: First. For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1)   That the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. These requisites for the jurisdiction of DARAB have been reiterated by the Court in a number of cases.[9]
2004-09-01
CALLEJO, SR., J.
At the outset, it must be stressed that this Court is not a trier of facts.[20] Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court, except when the lower court and the CA arrived at diverse factual findings.[21] The petitioners in this case assail the finding of both the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner Laspiñas was driving at a very fast speed before the bus owned by petitioner Tiu collided with respondent Condor's stalled truck. This is clearly one of fact, not reviewable by the Court in a petition for review under Rule 45.[22]
2004-07-14
TINGA, J,
It must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts, and under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for review to be given due course should raise only questions of law.[16] This rule finds even greater application when the findings of fact of the trial court were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case.[17]
2004-05-27
CALLEJO, SR., J.
We have consistently ruled that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved.[26] However, we have also ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive and weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[27]
2004-04-15
CALLEJO, SR., J.
The petitioners question the findings of the Court of Appeals as to whether the payment of the petitioners' obligation to the private respondent was properly made, thus, extinguishing the same. This is clearly a factual issue, and beyond the purview of the Court to delve into. This is in consonance with the well-settled rule that findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on the Court.[17] Furthermore, it is not the Court's function under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.[18]