This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2009-01-19 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Here, accused-appellant claimed that at 2 o'clock on the morning of December 25, 2000, he was at his friend's house in Sta. Mesa, having left his house in Mandaluyong because of a quarrel with his wife, Divina. Prosecution witness Jundos' testimony, however, positively placed the accused-appellant near the scene of the crime at the same time on December 25, 2000. Surely, between the positive assertions of the prosecution witness and the negative averments of accused-appellant, the former indisputably deserve more credence and evidentiary weight.[36] | |||||
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2009-01-19 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Denial is intrinsically a weak defense and must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability in order to be credible. Correspondingly, courts view the defense of alibi with suspicion and caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be fabricated easily. [37] | |||||
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2006-02-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioner's defense of alibi likewise fails. As against positive identification by prosecution witnesses, the accused's alibi is worthless.[30] Having been identified by two credible witnesses, petitioner cannot escape liability. Moreover, for alibi to prosper, it must be proven that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis.[31] Courts view the defense of alibi with suspicion and caution not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also it can be fabricated easily.[32] As found by the trial court, it was not physically impossible for petitioner to be at the crime scene when the crime was committed since it only takes a ten-minute ride from the place where he allegedly alighted from the car of one Berting Soriano to the crime scene. We have held that:Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused's presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.[33] | |||||
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2004-06-17 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| However, in the case of People v. Dela Cruz,[85] it was held that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000, as in the present case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. This Court ratiocinated that it was anomalous and unfair that the heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages amounting to less than P25,000 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000 temperate damages. | |||||
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2004-06-09 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| We agree with the appellant that he is guilty only of homicide. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently established by the prosecution. To prove treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself.[17] The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation.[18] | |||||
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2004-06-04 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| For failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the appellant can only be convicted of homicide. The penalty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree, namely, prision mayor. Thus, the appellant may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.[42] | |||||
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2004-02-23 |
PUNO, J. |
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| The actual damages awarded in the amount of P35,014.00 representing wake, funeral and burial expenses cannot be sustained. The receipts submitted by witness Randy Caspillo only prove expenses in the amount of P13,250.00. Nonetheless, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 can be awarded. This is in keeping with recent jurisprudence to the effect that when actual damages established by receipts during trial amount to less than P25,000.00, which in this case is only P13,250.00, an award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified.[26] | |||||