This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-08-19 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital securities market.[40] Manipulative devices and deceptive practices, including insider trading, throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. When someone trades in the market with unfair advantage in the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become worthless. Given enough of stock market scandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain of capital. And investors would eventually feel more secure with their money invested elsewhere.[41] In its barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities based on knowledge of material information not disclosed to the public at the time. Clearly, an allegation of insider trading involves the propensity of a person to engage in fraudulent activities that may speak of his moral character. | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Respondent's contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v. CA,[21] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,[23] the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases. | |||||
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2009-04-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The situation herein differs from that in the recent case of SEC v. Interport,[7] where the Court had occasion to reexamine the principles governing the prescription of offenses punishable under special laws. Therein, the Court found that the investigative proceedings conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission had tolled the prescriptive period for violations of the Revised Securities Act, even if no subsequent criminal cases were instituted within the prescriptive period. The basic difference lies in the fact that no taint of invalidity had attached to the authority of the SEC to conduct such investigation, whereas the preliminary investigation conducted herein by the PCGG is simply void ab initio for want of authority. | |||||