This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2011-02-02 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Indeed, the failure to file appellants' brief within the period granted by the appellate court results in the abandonment of the appeal which can lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for its reconsideration.[13] However, since it was duly proven that neither petitioners nor their counsel actually received the Notice to file brief sent by the CA, there was no abandonment of the appeal. The CA has, therefore, erred in dismissing petitioners' appeal. | |||||
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2009-03-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The circulars of this Court prescribing technical and other procedural requirements are meant to promptly dispose of unmeritorious petitions that clog the docket and waste the time of the courts. These technical and procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure, not suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain their prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.[12] Thus, in a considerable number of cases,[13] the Court has deemed it fit to suspend its own rules or to exempt a particular case from its strict operation where the appellant failed to perfect his appeal within the reglementary period, resulting in the appellate court's failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case. With more reason, there should be wider latitude in exempting a case from the strictures of procedural rules when the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case and, as in this case, petitioners failed to file the appellants' brief[14] on time. | |||||
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2008-03-14 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or death, an appeal is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion. It may be availed of only in the manner provided by law and the rules.[21] | |||||
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2006-07-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| As a rule, a party who did not appeal from a decision of a court cannot obtain affirmative relief other than that granted in the appealed decision.[5] This applies also to decisions of administrative or quasi-judicial tribunals.[6] In the present case, however, while respondents did not appeal from CSC Resolution No. 991110 dated May 27, 1999 which merely ordered reinstatement and that they raised the issue of backwages only in the present motion, these did not preclude them from praying for the monetary benefits provided by law. Where an ironhanded application of the rules will result in an unmistakable failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be disregarded in order to resolve the case.[7] This Court is, therefore, constrained to relax the rules to give way to the supreme and overriding interest of labor and justice. Indeed, laws and rules should be interpreted and applied not in a vacuum or in isolated abstraction but in light of surrounding circumstances and attendant facts in order to afford justice to all.[8] | |||||
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2006-01-31 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In numerous cases, the Court has allowed liberal construction of the Rules of Court with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals, when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[30] Indeed, laws and rules should be interpreted and applied not in a vacuum or in isolated abstraction but in light of surrounding circumstances and attendant facts in order to afford justice to all.[31] Thus, where a decision may be made to rest on informed judgment rather than rigid rules, the equities of the case must be accorded their due weight because labor determinations should not only be secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem.[32] | |||||
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2005-09-30 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Further, while it has been held that making a false statement in a PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document,[35] this Court likewise has held that laws and rules should be interpreted and applied not in a vacuum or in isolated abstraction but in light of surrounding circumstances and attendant facts in order to afford justice to all.[36] | |||||
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2005-02-14 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| It bears stressing that the NLRC still had jurisdiction over the appeal of the petitioner herein and had the authority to see to it that its resolution conformed to the law. It is thus absurd for the NLRC, and for the CA for that matter, to rule that the petitioner was dismissed without a lawful or valid cause and yet declare that he is not entitled to monetary benefits as provided by the law. As gleaned from the petition for certiorari of the petitioner in the CA, he prayed that he be granted the monetary benefits under Article 279 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, considering that as found by the NLRC under its May 28, 1997 Resolution, he was dismissed without any valid or lawful cause. Where an ironhanded application of the rules will result in an unmistakable failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be transgressed in order to resolve the case.[12] This Court is, therefore, constrained to relax the rules to give way to the supreme and overriding interest of labor and justice.[13] | |||||
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2004-12-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The above conclusion, however, will not deter this Court from proceeding with the judicial determination of the basic legal issues herein. We must bear in mind that procedural rules are intended to ensure the proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice.[14] A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.[15] Noting that this case involves the exercise of a fundamental right - academic freedom no less - of the State University, and that the petitioner has, in any event, raised before us the legal question of whether the RTC correctly required respondent to confer cum laude honors on the petitioner because of respondent's alleged grave abuse of discretion, for pragmatic reasons and consideration of justice and equity, the Court must go on to resolve the second assignment of error. | |||||