This case has been cited 10 times or more.
2013-07-24 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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With regard to the second element of self-defense, the Court finds that the means employed by Rogelio is grossly disproportionate to Abacco's alleged unlawful aggression. Abacco was violently slain and practically butchered. He suffered multiple blows to the head, neck, arms, and back. The blade of the samurai sword not only sliced through his flesh but penetrated and even exposed his bones. In fact, one particular laceration almost transected his spinal cord. Suffice it to say that a plea of self-defense is belied by the "nature, number, and location of the wounds" inflicted on the victim "since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to defend."[21] Here, the wounds sustained by Abacco clearly show Rogelio's intent to kill him and not merely to prevent or repel an attack from him. Verily, the means employed by Rogelio were unreasonable and excessive, thus, his plea of self-defense is unacceptable. | |||||
2011-07-04 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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Moreover, as testified to by the attending physician Dr. Yee, Romeo sustained a stab wound causing injuries on his liver, gall bladder, duodenum and the pancreas which resulted to massive blood loss. [24] He eventually died of multiple vital organ failure. Clearly the wound inflicted by Danny on Romeo indicate a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend. [25] As has been repeatedly ruled, the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense. [26] | |||||
2010-04-12 |
PEREZ, J. |
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Significantly, Mr. Cesar and PO3 Ceferino Gatchalian uniformly attested to the more material fact that it was only appellant Paghunasan who alighted from the motorcycle and who approached them to receive the ransom money. To the mind of this Court, this is enough to make their identification of appellant Paghunasan worthy of belief. Indeed, perfect symmetry between the testimonies of the witnesses, while desirable, is not absolutely required for them to be deemed credible. To be deserving of belief, it is enough that the testimonies of the witnesses concur on material points.[75] | |||||
2009-12-04 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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The inconsistencies Fernando cited relate to extraneous matters that do not in any way affect the material points of the crime charged. The seeming inconsistency with regard to where Fernando and Cortez exactly were when the sachets of shabu changed hands--be they in a kubo, as PO3 Credo mentioned,[7] or under a santol tree, as SPO3 Fernandez[8] and P/Insp. Dumlao[9] asserted--is of little moment and hardly of any bearing on the central fact of the commission of the crime. In context, the more important occurrence relates to Fernando and his companions scampering in different directions when the policemen chanced upon them, and that Fernando, when apprehended, was holding a bag which contained shabu and drug paraphernalia--facts categorically confirmed by the prosecution witnesses. It is perhaps too much to hope that different eyewitnesses shall give, at all times, testimonies that are in all fours with the realities on the ground. Minor discrepancies in their testimonies are in fact to be expected; they neither vitiate the essential integrity of the evidence in its material entirety nor reflect adversely on the credibility of witnesses. Inconsistencies deflect suspicions that the testimony is rehearsed or concocted. And as jurisprudence teaches, honest differing accounts on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime.[10] | |||||
2008-04-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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Appellant assails the full faith and credit given to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, especially on the testimony of Sakandal. Appellant avers that Sakandal's testimony is marred by inconsistencies considering that he initially stated in categorical terms that he was sitting beside the victim when the latter was shot from behind. Sakandal later testified that he was passing behind the nipa hut where the appellant was sleeping when he saw the latter shoot the victim. We have consistently ruled that on matters involving the credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses since it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.[33] The trial court has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while on the stand, it can discern whether or not they are telling the truth.[34] The unbending jurisprudence is that its findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.[35] It is well to remind appellant that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in the case at bar, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.[36] The jurisprudential doctrine that great weight is accorded to the factual findings of the trial court particularly on the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses can only be discarded or disturbed when it appears in the record that the trial court overlooked, ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have altered the result.[37] There are no cogent reasons to depart from the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Sakandal does not negate his eyewitness account that he saw appellant shoot the victim. Even then, witnesses cannot be expected to give a flawless testimony all the time.[38] Although there may be inconsistencies in minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses, where, as in this case, there is no inconsistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant.[39] Moreover, minor inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than diminish the prosecution's case as they tend to erase suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed, thereby negating any misgivings that the same were perjured.[40] Similarly, we note that the eyewitness Sakandal, who is appellant's brother, was shown to have no ill motive to falsely testify against the appellant. In fact, from the mouth of the appellant himself, it was confirmed that prior to the incident, he was in good relationship with his brother, Sakandal. Moreover, appellant also testified that they were very close to each other, and that they did not have any misunderstanding.[41] The same was also true with eyewitness Kaluh who testified against him. Kaluh was five arms' length away from the scene of the crime. Indeed, the testimonies of Sakandal and Kaluh are a positive identification of appellant as the assailant. These constitute direct evidence.[42] Sakandal and Kaluh are eyewitnesses to the very act of the commission of the crime and positively identified the appellant as the offender. | |||||
2007-08-28 |
CORONA, J. |
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The nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove accused-appellant's claim of self-defense.[25] On this account, the appellate court correctly ruled that the accused-appellant's version that he fought face to face with the victim was inconsistent with the fatal stab wound at the victim's back. Moreover, the wounds inflicted by accused-appellant on the victim indicated a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend.[26] | |||||
2007-07-10 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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He [Rogelio] was investigated by the police anent this case at the Municipal Hall of Bilar where he also executed an affidavit (Exhibit "1" for the defense). It was Fred Pangan, Acting Chief of Police, who took his affidavit, Fred Pangan asked him questions relative to the incident, and he told him everything that he saw. However, when he was asked to explain why it is not reflected in his affidavit that he actually saw the accused hack Teodoro Luzano, he answered that he believed that everything he said were already included in his affidavit, including that part wherein he actually saw Nestor hack Teodoro.[19] As can be gleaned from the foregoing, it was Rogelio's honest belief that he was able to state in his affidavit the fact that he saw petitioner hack Teodoro. Rogelio's elucidation is understandable and does not affect his credibility since witnesses cannot be expected to give a flawless testimony all the time. This is even more true if they are called to testify on details of a harrowing and frightening event which unfolded before their eyes.[20] What is decisive and significant is that Rogelio saw the petitioner hack Teodoro and that he testified on such fact during the trial. | |||||
2007-01-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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A witness testifying about the same nerve-wracking incident can hardly be expected to be correct in every detail and consistent with other witnesses in every respect, considering the inevitability of differences in perception, recollection, viewpoint, or impressions, as well as in their physical, mental, emotional, and psychological states at the time of the reception and recall of such impressions.[22] Thus, we have followed the rule in accord with human nature and experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to conscience and numbing to senses.[23] | |||||
2006-12-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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Witnesses cannot be expected to give a flawless testimony all the time. This is even more true if they are called to testify on details of a harrowing and frightening event which unfolded before their eyes. Minor discrepancies might be found in their testimony but they do not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole, nor should they reflect adversely on the witness' credibility as they erase suspicion that the same was rehearsed or concocted. Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime.[26] | |||||
2005-05-26 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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Even in criminal law, where the quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy.[40] It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.[41] If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is proved.[42] These truisms find more application in administrative proceedings where, as earlier intimated, the quantum of evidence required is substantive evidence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. |