This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2007-01-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In Salvador v. Desierto,[30] we ruled:On the issue of whether respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against respondents, let it be stressed that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form [and] substance or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. Thus, saved on well-recognized exceptions,[31] this Court has almost adopted quite aptly, a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's constitutionally mandated powers.[32] | |||||
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2006-09-08 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This Court consistently refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, 'beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service. The same ruling was reiterated in Salvador v. Desierto, et al.,[17] where the Court further declared:On the issue of whether respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against respondents, let it be stressed that the Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or substance or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. | |||||
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2006-07-21 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Upon the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no cogent reason that would justify a deviation from the general rule. It is well-settled that as long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, his decision will not be overturned.[28] In the present case, the finding of the Ombudsman that there is no probable cause to sustain the charges against private respondents is supported by substantial evidence: First, the Ombudsman appears to have relied primarily upon the contents of the Executive Summary[29] prepared by petitioner in drawing the conclusion that the original and subsequent loans were not under-collateralized. Notably, the original loan was granted upon the condition that the assets to be acquired by SABEMCOR would serve as collateral for the same. The value of the assets to be acquired upon which a mortgage was to be constituted was even higher than the value of the proposed loan amount.[30] As additional security, SABEMCOR was also required to assign the following to DBP: | |||||
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2004-07-29 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| "The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy." Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously reckoned the prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019 (committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution) from the discovery of the violation.[66] In Republic v. Desierto, the Court explained: "This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale, in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. In the said recent case, the Board of Directors of the Philippine Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank of the Philippines were charged with violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA No. 3019, by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, created by then President Fidel V. Ramos to investigate and to recover the so-called 'Behest Loans', where the Philippine Government guaranteed several foreign loans to corporations and entities connected with the former President Marcos. x x x In holding that the case had not yet prescribed, this Court ruled that: 'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the 'beneficiaries of the loans.' Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. | |||||