Lawyerly

GR No. 169303

2015-02-11

PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY v. CELSO E. FUENTES

LEONEN, J.

Applying these cases, the general rule is that in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, this court will not review the factual determination of the administrative bodies governing labor, as well as the findings of fact by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals can conduct its own factual determination to ascertain whether the National Labor Relations Commission has committed grave abuse of discretion.[78] "In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again."[79]

GR No. 200575

2014-02-05

INTEL TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES v. NLRC

MENDOZA, J.

Resignation is the formal relinquishment of an office,[24] the overt act of which is coupled with an intent to renounce. This intent could be inferred from the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation.[25]

GR No. 175481

2012-11-21

DIONISIO F. AUZA v. MOL PHILIPPINES

DEL CASTILLO, J.

"Resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office."[50] The overt act of relinquishment should be coupled with an intent to relinquish, which intent could be inferred from the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation.[51]

GR No. 169227

2010-07-05

PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT v. VIRGILIO E. PULGAR

BRION, J.

While we recognize the rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, in the present case, however, the facts and the evidence do not establish a prima facie case that the employee was dismissed from employment. Before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to its legality or illegality.[19] Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.[20]

GR No. 176700

2009-09-04

ROMERO MONTEDERAMOS v. TRI-UNION INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

CARPIO MORALES, J.

That respondent advised petitioner on July 31, 2003 that he was "supposed to report . . . [the following day], August 1, 2003" but that he was given a chance to report on August 11, 2003 does not, in itself, amount to constructive dismissal. Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.[21]

GR NO. 178976

2009-07-31

ABELARDO P. ABEL v. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

CARPIO MORALES, J.

While it is well-established that the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it via a petition for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law,[17] excepted therefrom is where, as in the present case, the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter, then the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.[18]

GR No. 164804

2009-01-30

VIRGINIA A. SUGUE v. TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

For her part, Sugue condemns Triumph for putting a condition on the approval of her two days vacation leave for July 14 and 15, 2000, when she was required to first submit a report on the 2001 Marketing Plan. To be very accurate, Mr. Escueta's memorandum dated July 13, 2000 advised Sugue that her application for leave will be approved if she will commit to submit her reports in connection with the 2001 Marketing Plan by July 17, 2000, which was two days after her leave. Again, we find nothing discriminatory in such a condition considering that she was unable to show that she was the only employee whose leave application has been subjected to a condition. Discrimination is the failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.[33] Sugue obviously failed to substantiate her claim of discrimination. To be sure, he who asserts must prove.[34] On the contrary, the record shows that as early as October 12, 1999, a memorandum was issued by Triumph addressed to all department heads that leave applications may be approved, disapproved or postponed depending on the (1) business status due to CBA; (2) company's urgent need for their presence; and (3) CBA negotiations status.[35] Evidently, this directive applies not just to Sugue but to all department heads. Although this memorandum was supposedly in force only until December 1999, it establishes a precedent for the company imposing conditions on the approval of leave applications of department heads.

GR No. 159808

2008-09-30

LEOPARD INTEGRATED SERVICES v. VIRGILIO MACALINAO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

While the well-established rule is that the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it via Rule 45 is limited to reviewing errors of law,[6] the admitted exception is where the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the labor arbiter, then the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.[7]

GR No. 165565

2008-07-14

SCHOOL OF HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY v. CORAZON P. TAGUIAM

QUISUMBING, J.

The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases.[13] However, where the issue is shrouded by a conflict of factual perception, we are constrained to review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. In this case, the findings of facts of the appellate court contradict those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. [14]

GR No. 154503

2008-02-29

UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB and VIVIAN M. APDUHAN v. NLRC and AMALIA P. KAWADA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

It is a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, not of fact.[40] The Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[41]

GR No. 175988

2007-08-24

MA. FININA E. VICENTE v. CA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

In the same vein, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally not subject to this Court's review under Rule 45. However, the general rule on the conclusiveness of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals is also subject to well-recognized exceptions such as where the Court of Appeals' findings of facts contradict those of the lower court, or the administrative bodies, as in this case.[18] All these considered, we are compelled to make a further calibration of the evidence at hand.

GR NO. 152531

2007-07-27

RODELIA S. FUNGO v. LOURDES SCHOOL OF MANDALUYONG

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

It is a well-established rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the same Rules is limited to reviewing errors of law.[6] This Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding. Thus, it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again.[7]

GR NO. 164198

2007-06-15

ALAY SA KAPATID INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION v. ROMULO DOMINGUEZ

QUISUMBING, J.

At the outset, we must stress that in petitions for review, only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court, and in labor cases, this applies with greater force. Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.[10] This rule, however, is not ironclad. Where, as in this case, the issue is shrouded by a conflict of factual perceptions by the lower courts, we are constrained to review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.[11]

GR NO. 169464

2006-08-31

ROQUE D.A. DATOR v. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

All told, petitioner's complaint cannot be sustained. An employee's bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.[22] As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:A constructive dismissal occurs when the law deems that there is effectively a termination of employment or "a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, such as in an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay." Where, as in the present case, the employer was fully justified in giving a faculty member a lesser load because the latter is disqualified under applicable rules from handling a full load, and where the faculty member committed repeated misrepresentations in his bid to maintain his full load, we cannot see any legal or factual basis to conclude that the faculty member had been constructively dismissed.

GR NO. 153625

2006-07-31

HEIRS OF MARCELINO CABAL

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

As a general rule, in petitions for review, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[41] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[42] Accordingly, findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on the Supreme Court.[43]

GR NO. 149542

2006-07-20

ALBERTO HERBON v. LEOPOLDO T. PALAD

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

As a general rule, in petitions for review, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[19] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[20] Accordingly, findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on the Supreme Court.[21]

GR NO. 132388

2006-04-10

RAFAEL M. FAJARDO v. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

On the first issue, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals should have held respondents liable for damages. This is a factual issue. It is a well-established rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals, via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is limited to reviewing errors of law, for this Court is not a trier of facts.[6] We find no reason to depart from the rule. Accordingly, we shall not delve into this issue.

GR No. 152545/165687

2005-11-15

R-II BUILDERS v. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION

GARCIA, J.

The all too-familiar rule is that the Court will not, in a petition for review on certiorari, entertain matters factual in nature, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons,[17] like when such factual findings were drawn from a vacuum or arbitrarily reached[18], or are grounded entirely on speculation or conjectures, are conflicting or are premised on the supposed evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record or when the inference made is manifestly mistaken or absurd.[19] Ramos vs. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.[20] offers another formulation of the same rule, as follows:xxx findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court and will not be overturned when supported by the evidence on record save in the known exceptions such as gross appreciation of the evidence or misapprehension of facts.

	GR No. 169303 2015-02-11	PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY v. CELSO E. FUENTES LEONEN, J.
Applying these cases, the general rule is that in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, this court will not review the factual determination of the administrative bodies governing labor, as well as the findings of fact by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals can conduct its own factual determination to ascertain whether the National Labor Relations Commission has committed grave abuse of discretion.[78] "In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again."[79]
	GR No. 200575 2014-02-05	INTEL TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES v. NLRC MENDOZA, J.
Resignation is the formal relinquishment of an office,[24] the overt act of which is coupled with an intent to renounce. This intent could be inferred from the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation.[25]
	GR No. 175481 2012-11-21	DIONISIO F. AUZA v. MOL PHILIPPINES DEL CASTILLO, J.
"Resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office."[50] The overt act of relinquishment should be coupled with an intent to relinquish, which intent could be inferred from the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation.[51]
	GR No. 169227 2010-07-05	PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT v. VIRGILIO E. PULGAR BRION, J.
While we recognize the rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, in the present case, however, the facts and the evidence do not establish a prima facie case that the employee was dismissed from employment. Before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to its legality or illegality.[19] Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.[20]
	GR No. 176700 2009-09-04	ROMERO MONTEDERAMOS v. TRI-UNION INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION CARPIO MORALES, J.
That respondent advised petitioner on July 31, 2003 that he was "supposed to report . . . [the following day], August 1, 2003" but that he was given a chance to report on August 11, 2003 does not, in itself, amount to constructive dismissal. Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.[21]
	GR NO. 178976 2009-07-31	ABELARDO P. ABEL v. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION CARPIO MORALES, J.
While it is well-established that the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it via a petition for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law,[17] excepted therefrom is where, as in the present case, the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter, then the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.[18]
	GR No. 164804 2009-01-30	VIRGINIA A. SUGUE v. TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
For her part, Sugue condemns Triumph for putting a condition on the approval of her two days vacation leave for July 14 and 15, 2000, when she was required to first submit a report on the 2001 Marketing Plan. To be very accurate, Mr. Escueta's memorandum dated July 13, 2000 advised Sugue that her application for leave will be approved if she will commit to submit her reports in connection with the 2001 Marketing Plan by July 17, 2000, which was two days after her leave. Again, we find nothing discriminatory in such a condition considering that she was unable to show that she was the only employee whose leave application has been subjected to a condition. Discrimination is the failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.[33] Sugue obviously failed to substantiate her claim of discrimination. To be sure, he who asserts must prove.[34] On the contrary, the record shows that as early as October 12, 1999, a memorandum was issued by Triumph addressed to all department heads that leave applications may be approved, disapproved or postponed depending on the (1) business status due to CBA; (2) company's urgent need for their presence; and (3) CBA negotiations status.[35] Evidently, this directive applies not just to Sugue but to all department heads. Although this memorandum was supposedly in force only until December 1999, it establishes a precedent for the company imposing conditions on the approval of leave applications of department heads.
	GR No. 159808 2008-09-30	LEOPARD INTEGRATED SERVICES v. VIRGILIO MACALINAO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
While the well-established rule is that the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it via Rule 45 is limited to reviewing errors of law,[6] the admitted exception is where the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the labor arbiter, then the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.[7]
	GR No. 165565 2008-07-14	SCHOOL OF HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY v. CORAZON P. TAGUIAM QUISUMBING, J.
The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases.[13] However, where the issue is shrouded by a conflict of factual perception, we are constrained to review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. In this case, the findings of facts of the appellate court contradict those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. [14]
	GR No. 154503 2008-02-29	UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB and VIVIAN M. APDUHAN v. NLRC and AMALIA P. KAWADA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
It is a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, not of fact.[40] The Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[41]
	GR No. 175988 2007-08-24	MA. FININA E. VICENTE v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In the same vein, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally not subject to this Court's review under Rule 45. However, the general rule on the conclusiveness of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals is also subject to well-recognized exceptions such as where the Court of Appeals' findings of facts contradict those of the lower court, or the administrative bodies, as in this case.[18] All these considered, we are compelled to make a further calibration of the evidence at hand.
	GR NO. 152531 2007-07-27	RODELIA S. FUNGO v. LOURDES SCHOOL OF MANDALUYONG SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
It is a well-established rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the same Rules is limited to reviewing errors of law.[6] This Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding. Thus, it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh the evidence all over again.[7]
	GR NO. 164198 2007-06-15	ALAY SA KAPATID INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION v. ROMULO DOMINGUEZ QUISUMBING, J.
At the outset, we must stress that in petitions for review, only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court, and in labor cases, this applies with greater force. Factual questions are for labor tribunals to resolve.[10] This rule, however, is not ironclad. Where, as in this case, the issue is shrouded by a conflict of factual perceptions by the lower courts, we are constrained to review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.[11]
	GR NO. 169464 2006-08-31	ROQUE D.A. DATOR v. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
All told, petitioner's complaint cannot be sustained. An employee's bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.[22] As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:A constructive dismissal occurs when the law deems that there is effectively a termination of employment or "a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, such as in an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay." Where, as in the present case, the employer was fully justified in giving a faculty member a lesser load because the latter is disqualified under applicable rules from handling a full load, and where the faculty member committed repeated misrepresentations in his bid to maintain his full load, we cannot see any legal or factual basis to conclude that the faculty member had been constructively dismissed.
	GR NO. 153625 2006-07-31	HEIRS OF MARCELINO CABAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
As a general rule, in petitions for review, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[41] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[42] Accordingly, findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on the Supreme Court.[43]
	GR NO. 149542 2006-07-20	ALBERTO HERBON v. LEOPOLDO T. PALAD AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
As a general rule, in petitions for review, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[19] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[20] Accordingly, findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on the Supreme Court.[21]
	GR NO. 132388 2006-04-10	RAFAEL M. FAJARDO v. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
On the first issue, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals should have held respondents liable for damages. This is a factual issue. It is a well-established rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals, via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is limited to reviewing errors of law, for this Court is not a trier of facts.[6] We find no reason to depart from the rule. Accordingly, we shall not delve into this issue.
	GR No. 152545/165687 2005-11-15	R-II BUILDERS v. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION GARCIA, J.
The all too-familiar rule is that the Court will not, in a petition for review on certiorari, entertain matters factual in nature, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons,[17] like when such factual findings were drawn from a vacuum or arbitrarily reached[18], or are grounded entirely on speculation or conjectures, are conflicting or are premised on the supposed evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record or when the inference made is manifestly mistaken or absurd.[19] Ramos vs. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.[20] offers another formulation of the same rule, as follows:xxx findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court and will not be overturned when supported by the evidence on record save in the known exceptions such as gross appreciation of the evidence or misapprehension of facts.

FERNANDO GO v. CA