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PEOPLE v. LEVI SUMARAGO

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 215319 2015-10-21	PEOPLE v. APOLONIO BABOR VILLARAMA, JR., J.
[Atty. Lajot] Q: This wound (sic) Nos. 3, 4 and 5, would it be possible that the victim was standing at the time these injuries were inflicted? x x x x [Dr. Brun-Salvatierra] A: Yes.[16] (Emphasis supplied) The Court has ruled that possibility is not synonymous with evidence.[17] The mere possibility stated and the lack of a categorical statement that the wounds could not have possibly been inflicted while the victim was lying down as positively narrated by Marife necessarily dismantle the contention of accused-appellant.
	GR No. 187077 2011-02-23	PEOPLE v. ALEX CONDES Y GUANZON MENDOZA, J.
The twin requisites of minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender being special qualifying circumstances, which increase the penalty as opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which only affects the period of the penalty, should be alleged in the information because of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[44] The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000, explicitly mandates that the information must state in ordinary and concise language the qualifying and aggravating circumstances attending an offense. Although the crime of rape in this case was committed before the effectivity of the new rules, it should be applied retroactively, as the same is favorable to an accused.[45]
	GR No. 182517 2009-03-13	PEOPLE v. MANUEL BRIOSO Y TANDA NACHURA, J.
For the accused to be held guilty of consummated rape, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) there has been carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused; (2) the accused achieved the act through force or intimidation upon the victim because the latter was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.[16] Considering that carnal knowledge is the central element in the crime of rape, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[17] Carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that rape has been committed and that the accused was the perpetrator thereof.[18]
	GR No. 178067 2008-08-11	PEOPLE v. ABDELKARIM AHMAD ALKODHA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
A I was already bleeding, sir.[16] We do not see an inconsistency here. At most, this only proves that the part of AAA's testimony on direct examination in which AAA said accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina did not come from personal knowledge, but from an inference from her bleeding when she woke up. This, however, is not sufficient reason for us to overturn the appealed Decision. We have ruled that carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that rape has been committed and that the accused is the perpetrator thereof.[17] The actuations of accused-appellant before AAA fainted, the bleeding of AAA's private part afterwards, and the corroboration by physical evidence on the part of Dr. Palmero, when taken together, convincingly prove the carnal knowledge of AAA by accused-appellant.
	GR No. 177749 2007-12-17	PEOPLE v. MANUEL AGUILAR CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In this case, while the minority of the victim was properly alleged in the Information, her relationship with appellant was not properly stated therein because what appears in the information is that the victim is the stepdaughter of appellant. A stepdaughter is the daughter of one's spouse by a previous marriage. For appellant to be the stepfather of AAA, he must be legally married to AAA's mother.[56] And the best evidence to prove the marriage between the appellant and the mother of the complainant is their marriage contract.[57] But the records of this case failed to show that the appellant and the mother of AAA were legally married, there being no marriage certificate ever presented to prove the same. In fact, both the appellant and the mother of AAA admitted that they were not really married, and what they had was merely a common-law relationship. The Information thus failed to allege specifically that appellant was the common-law spouse of the victim's mother. Instead, the Information erroneously alleged the qualifying circumstance that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. Hence, the appellant is liable only for the crime of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.