This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-11-23 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be determined A without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words should be understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did not.[173] (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted) | |||||
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2015-08-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| c). Nothing said herein shall preclude any private person from initiating or prosecuting any case to enforce any claimed right in his/her favour against Benedicto and/or his associates and nominees herein mentioned for any cause whatsoever.[57] Given the foregoing considerations, the Court is hard-pressed to rule against a finding of a stipulation pour autrui in favor of Africa. The Compromise Agreement, taken in its entirety, belies any intention of the parties to include Africa as one of its beneficiaries. Considering that Africa was neither a party nor one of the intended beneficiaries of the Compromise Agreement, and absent any stipulations pour autrui in his favor, the rule on relativity of contracts, i.e., that only the parties thereto and their privies acquire rights and assume obligations thereunder, prevails.[58] No rule is more settled than that the parties' intent is "embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from the express language of the agreement."[59] | |||||
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2013-03-06 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| It has been explained by the Supreme Court in Norton Resources and Development Corporation v. All Asia Bank Corporation[50] in reiteration of the ruling in Benguet Corporation v. Cabildo[51] that: x x x A court's purpose in examining a contract is to interpret the intent of the contracting parties, as objectively manifested by them. The process of interpreting a contract requires the court to make a preliminary inquiry as to whether the contract before it is ambiguous. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two reasonable alternative interpretations. Where the written terms of the contract are not ambiguous and can only be read one way, the court will interpret the contract as a matter of law. x x x | |||||
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2010-08-02 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The most fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts is that, if the terms are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of the contract provisions shall control.[14] Its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words should be understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did not.[15] | |||||
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2009-11-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Our ruling in Benguet Corporation, et al. v. Cesar Cabildo[20] is instructive: The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is embodied in the first paragraph of Article 1370 of the Civil Code: "[i]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control." This provision is akin to the "plain meaning rule" applied by Pennsylvania courts, which assumes that the intent of the parties to an instrument is "embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from the express language of the agreement." It also resembles the "four corners" rule, a principle which allows courts in some cases to search beneath the semantic surface for clues to meaning. A court's purpose in examining a contract is to interpret the intent of the contracting parties, as objectively manifested by them. The process of interpreting a contract requires the court to make a preliminary inquiry as to whether the contract before it is ambiguous. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two reasonable alternative interpretations. Where the written terms of the contract are not ambiguous and can only be read one way, the court will interpret the contract as a matter of law. If the contract is determined to be ambiguous, then the interpretation of the contract is left to the court, to resolve the ambiguity in the light of the intrinsic evidence. | |||||