This case has been cited 15 times or more.
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2015-06-16 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Under the regime of the 1935 Constitution, there was no constitutional provision on the delegation of the power to tax to municipal corporations. They only derived such under a limited statutory authority, outside of which, it was deemed withheld.[21] Local governments, thus, had very restricted taxing powers which they derive from numerous tax laws. This highly-centralized government structure was later seen to have arrested the growth and efficient operations of LGUs, paving the way for the adoption of a more decentralized system which granted LGUs local autonomy, both administrative and fiscal autonomy.[22] | |||||
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2010-02-10 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.[11] The courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.[12] | |||||
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2009-12-01 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[23] In this case, petitioners allege that they will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run in the 2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution. | |||||
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2008-12-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[22] | |||||
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2008-10-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.[87] | |||||
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2008-02-15 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| Respondents[16] denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioner's legal standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the "fair warning" issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTC's mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry.[17] It was also stressed that "most of the [television] and radio stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP."[18] | |||||
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2008-02-13 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The least we can do to ensure genuine and meaningful local autonomy is not to force an interpretation that negates powers explicitly granted to local governments. To rule against the power of LGUs to reclassify areas within their jurisdiction will subvert the principle of local autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.[160] As we have noted in earlier decisions, our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.[161] | |||||
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2007-09-13 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,[40] so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.[41] In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.[42] Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness -- save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.[43] | |||||
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2006-10-17 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Jurisprudence is replete with decisions invalidating laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent with the Constitution. In Pelaez v. Auditor General,[33] the Court considered repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 authorizing the Executive to change the seat of the government of any subdivision of local governments, upon the approval of the 1935 Constitution. Section 68 was adjudged incompatible and inconsistent with the Constitutional grant of limited executive supervision over local governments. In Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., v. Office of the Executive Secretary,[34] the Court declared Executive Order No. 46, entitled "Authorizing the Office on Muslim Affairs to Undertake Philippine Halal Certification," void for encroaching on the religious freedom of Muslims. In The Province of Batangas v. Romulo,[35] the Court declared some provisions of the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001 unconstitutional for violating the Constitutional precept on local autonomy. And in Ople v. Torres,[36] the Court likewise declared unconstitutional Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System," for being violative of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution. | |||||
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2006-06-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.[10] | |||||
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2006-05-03 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,[26] so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.[27] Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case[28] or dismiss it on ground of mootness.[29] | |||||
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2005-09-01 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.[53] Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.[54] | |||||
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2005-05-10 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Before resolving the foregoing issues, it is noted that petitioner Atienza and respondent Villarosa had ceased to be the Vice-Governor and Governor, respectively, of the Province of Occidental Mindoro effective June 30, 2004 when the newly-elected officials of the province took their oaths of offices. The petitioner Vice-Governor did not run for re-election during the May 2004 elections while the respondent Governor did not succeed in his re-election bid. The expiration of their terms of offices has effectively rendered the case moot. However, even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.[10] In this case, there is compelling reason for the Court to resolve the issues presented in order to clarify the scope of the respective powers of the Governor and Vice-Governor under the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| We do not agree with the contention of the respondent that the petition has become moot and academic following the Committee on Discipline's admission of the amended complaint of Ibañez, the alleged dismissal by the CSC of the charges against the petitioner for oppression and violation of existing civil service rules on time cards, and the withdrawal of the other charges. There is an imperative need for the Court to resolve the issues as to whether the petitioner was deprived of his right to due process and whether there was a legal basis for his suspension. Finally, as we have previously ruled, courts will resolve a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[22] | |||||