This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2015-07-01 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on defendant's property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors.[61] The garnished funds or attached properties could only be released to the attaching party after a judgment in his favor is obtained. Under no circumstance, whatsoever, can the garnished funds or attached properties, under the custody of the sheriff or the clerk of court, be released to the attaching party before the promulgation of judgment. | |||||
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2014-06-04 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never presumed. It is a conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact and is evidentiary.[15] There is no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith, therefore, stands in this case. | |||||
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2013-02-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| At most, Uy could have been charged with negligence in the performance of her duties as treasurer of Hammer by allowing the company to contract a loan despite its precarious financial position. Furthermore, if it was true, as petitioners claim, that she no longer performed the functions of a treasurer, then she should have formally resigned as treasurer to isolate herself from any liability that could result from her being an officer of the corporation. Nonetheless, these shortcomings of Uy are not sufficient to justify the piercing of the corporate veil which requires that the negligence of the officer must be so gross that it could amount to bad faith and must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Gross negligence is one that is characterized by the lack of the slightest care, acting or failing to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to the consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[30] | |||||
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2011-10-19 |
SERENO, J. |
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| A corporation, as a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and employees.[286] Obligations incurred as a result of the acts of the directors and officers as corporate agents are not their personal liabilities but those of the corporation they represent.[287] To hold a director or an officer personally liable for corporate obligations, two requisites must concur: (1) the complainant must allege in the complaint that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) the complainant must clearly and convincingly prove such unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith.[288] "To hold a director, a trustee or an officer personally liable for the debts of the corporation and, thus, pierce the veil of corporate fiction, bad faith or gross negligence by the director, trustee or officer in directing the corporate affairs must be established clearly and convincingly."[289] | |||||
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2010-08-25 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| For disregarding PAL's right of way, PAC's pilots were grossly negligent. Gross negligence is one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[47] | |||||
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2010-04-12 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Petitioner had, of course, endeavored to establish that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had served him a demand to vacate the subject parcel as early as 31 July 1996.[39] Correctly brushed aside by the Court of Appeals on the ground, among others, that respondent had no participation in its preparation, we find said demand letter of little or no use to petitioner's cause in view of its non-presentation before the MeTC. However, much as it may now be expedient for petitioner to anchor his cause thereon, said demand letter was first introduced in the record only as an attachment to his reply to respondent's comment to the motion for reconsideration of the 14 July 2005 order issued by the RTC.[40] The rule is settled, however, that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[41] Basic consideration of due process impels this rule.[42] | |||||