This case has been cited 28 times or more.
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2014-01-15 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness.[24] The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAA's ordeal.[25] The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant's narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime."[26] Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.[27] | |||||
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2013-06-05 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In addition, this Court will not contradict the RTC's findings, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, absent any valid reason. The trial court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding upon this Court.[29] In People v. Sapigao, Jr.,[30] we explained in detail the rationale for this practice: It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness' credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see are the cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an American court, "There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the appellate court." | |||||
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2011-07-04 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element. What is important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on her or deprived her of reason. [43] (Emphasis ours.) | |||||
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2010-05-04 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding upon this Court, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[29] In the instant case, we have no reason not to apply the rule considering the overwhelming evidence showing that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent and against her will by means of force and intimidation. | |||||
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2009-10-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| All in all, we find the evidence of the prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by accused-appellant. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[45] | |||||
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2009-08-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[58] | |||||
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2009-02-18 |
BRION, J. |
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| Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it.[55] Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary; force is not an element of statutory rape and the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the complainant is below the age of twelve.[56] The law presumes that a woman below this age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.[57] | |||||
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2009-02-10 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| INTERPRETER: Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom, wearing a yellow t-shirt, who upon being asked answered by the name Elister Basmayor.[31] Both trial court and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to the testimony of AAA on the rape that happened on 12 November 2001. They found the same to be sufficient to convict appellant of the crime charged. There being overwhelming evidence showing that on 12 November 2001 appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA by means of force and intimidation, we find no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[32] | |||||
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2008-12-24 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| After examining the testimony of the AAA, we find that it was neither made up nor coached. The questions propounded to AAA were leading. A question that suggests to the witness the answer, which the examining party wants, is a leading question. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years, as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.[30] | |||||
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2008-12-10 |
BRION, J. |
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| Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act.[33] Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary; they are not elements of statutory rape; the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve.[34] At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.[35] Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (1) the age of the complainant; (2) the identity of the accused; and (3) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. | |||||
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2008-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We find the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses more credible and convincing than those of the defense eyewitnesses. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[59] | |||||
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2008-07-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The issue of whether or not there was indeed a buy-bust operation primarily boils down to one of credibility. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies.[38] When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[39] The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.[40] | |||||
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2008-07-23 |
TINGA, J, |
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| With respect to Payot's civil liability, the Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of AAA, she being a victim of simple statutory rape.[40] | |||||
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2008-03-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We find the evidence of the prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by petitioner. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[50] | |||||
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2007-12-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In this case, while the minority of the victim was properly alleged in the Information, her relationship with appellant was not properly stated therein because what appears in the information is that the victim is the stepdaughter of appellant. A stepdaughter is the daughter of one's spouse by a previous marriage. For appellant to be the stepfather of AAA, he must be legally married to AAA's mother.[56] And the best evidence to prove the marriage between the appellant and the mother of the complainant is their marriage contract.[57] But the records of this case failed to show that the appellant and the mother of AAA were legally married, there being no marriage certificate ever presented to prove the same. In fact, both the appellant and the mother of AAA admitted that they were not really married, and what they had was merely a common-law relationship. The Information thus failed to allege specifically that appellant was the common-law spouse of the victim's mother. Instead, the Information erroneously alleged the qualifying circumstance that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. Hence, the appellant is liable only for the crime of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. | |||||
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2007-08-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We find the evidence of the prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by appellants. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[21] | |||||
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2007-04-23 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We find the evidence of the prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by petitioner. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[60] It is to be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC. In this regard, it is settled that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. We find no compelling reason to deviate from their findings.[61] | |||||
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2007-04-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Furthermore, the trial court's assessment of the facts deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[37] | |||||
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2007-03-23 |
TINGA, J. |
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| With respect to Senieres' civil liability, the Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of AAA for being a victim of simple statutory rape.[54] However, the award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages adjudged by the appellate court for the | |||||
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2007-03-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| After examining the testimony of the private complainant, we find no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[25] In the case at bar, there being overwhelming evidence showing that in September 1995 and in January 2000 appellant had carnal knowledge of private complainant by means of force and intimidation, we have no reason not to apply the rule and to apply the exception. | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| After a review of the testimony of the private complainant, We find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[27] In the case at bar, there being overwhelming evidence showing that on 24 December 1999 and 8 January 2000 appellant had carnal knowledge of private complainant by means of force, coercion and intimidation, we have no reason not to apply the rule and to apply the exception. | |||||
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2006-10-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, it is not essential that it be alleged in the information with ultimate precision. Section 11 of Rule 110[34] of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but that the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. The exact date of the commission is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent.[35] In this case, the prosecution adequately proved the fact of sexual intercourse by appellant against the will of AAA sometime in December 1999. The veracity of the rape charge is not dependent on the time of the commission of the offense but on the credibility of the offended party.[36] | |||||
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2006-10-23 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We find the findings of fact of the trial court to be in accord with the evidence on record. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[27] In the case at bar, we have no reason to depart from this principle and to apply the exception. The testimonies of Roque Ogrimen and Nonilio Marfil clearly establish the guilt of appellant as the assailant who took two shotguns from the victim. On top of such damning evidence, no evidence was adduced by the defense because appellant escaped detention, thus waiving his right to do so. Flight is a strong indication of guilt when it is done to escape from the authorities or to escape prosecution.[28] | |||||
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2006-09-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| For his part, all appellant had in his defense is denial. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense, which the accused must buttress with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[38] Appellant failed to corroborate any material allegation in his testimony. A mere denial constitutes negative evidence, which does not deserve greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.[39] | |||||
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2006-09-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[29] In the case at bar, there being overwhelming evidence showing that appellant had carnal knowledge of private complainant by means of force, we have no reason not to apply the rule and to apply the exception. | |||||
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2006-09-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The trial judge is accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability and willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party. (Emphasis supplied) The trend in procedural law is to give a wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child witness.[36] Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness,[37] child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of justice.[38] It must be borne in mind that the offended party in this case is a 6-year old minor who was barely five when she was sexually assaulted. As a child of such tender years not yet exposed to the ways of the world, she could not have fully understood the enormity of the bestial act committed on her person. Indeed " | |||||
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2006-08-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| A I felt sir that he was inserting his penis into my vagina[26] (Emphases supplied.) When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even more conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[27] In the case at bar, accused-appellant has not persuaded us to depart from this principle and to apply the exception. | |||||
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2005-09-14 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil indemnity and exemplary damages, which the trial court lumped together for all the crimes committed, by separately awarding the sums of P50,000.00[40] and P75,000.00[41] as civil indemnity in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and P25,000.00[42] as exemplary damages, for each count of rape, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. | |||||