This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-04-21 |
BRION, J. |
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| We cannot accept Jardine's shallow understanding of the concepts of redundancy and retrenchment in determining the validity of the severance of an employer-employee relationship. The fact that they are found together in just one provision does not necessarily give rise to the conclusion that the difference between them is immaterial. This Court has already ruled before that retrenchment and redundancy are two different concepts; they are not synonymous; thus, they should not be used interchangeably.[50] The clear distinction between these two concepts was discussed in Andrada, et al., v. NLRC,[51] citing the case of Sebuguero v. NLRC,[52] where this Court clarified: Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. | |||||
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2009-10-02 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Questions of fact are not proper in a Petition brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Time and time again, we have stated that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, [26] and this Court will decline to sift through the evidence submitted by the parties, particularly here, where such evidence was not presented before the trial court. It would be ludicrous indeed if we were to determine, in the first instance, where respondent actually resides, his true income, or his current mental state. Such issues are best threshed out before the trial court; we have neither the inclination or interest to resolve these factual matters here. | |||||
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2009-09-11 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| On the other hand, the OSG correctly argues that questions of fact are not proper in a petition brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[24] Put simply, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts,[25] and cannot be tasked to analyze, assess, and weigh the facts presented by the parties before the Ombudsman and the CA in order to ascertain if their appreciation of the evidence is correct.[26] Although there are recognized exceptions to this rule,[27] none of them apply to the present case. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, we have carefully examined all the evidence in this case, but still find that there is no sufficient reason to overturn the findings of the CA and the Office of the Ombudsman. | |||||