This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-07-22 |
CARPIO, ACTING CJ. |
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| The general rule is that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it, or from any other legal entity that it may be related to.[12] The obligations of a corporation, acting through its directors, officers, and employees, are its own sole liabilities.[13] Therefore, the corporation's directors, officers, or employees are generally not personally liable for the obligations of the corporation.[14] | |||||
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2013-09-04 |
REYES, J. |
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| In order to put said phrase in its proper perspective, reference must be made to the rule of statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[21] Section 62.2 should not be read in isolation of the other provision included in Section 62, particularly Section 62.1, which provides for the prescriptive period for the enforcement of civil liability in cases of violations of Sections 56, 57, 57.1(a) and 57.1(b). | |||||
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2013-02-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Basic is the rule in corporation law that a corporation is a juridical entity which is vested with a legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. Following this principle, obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. A director, officer or employee of a corporation is generally not held personally liable for obligations incurred by the corporation.[24] Nevertheless, this legal fiction may be disregarded if it is used as a means to perpetrate fraud or an illegal act, or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.[25] | |||||
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2010-08-03 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The provision of the law being clear and unambiguous, petitioner's interpretation that a "proprietor," as he was designated in the Information, is not among those specifically mentioned under Sec. 28(f) as liable, does not lie. For the word connotes management, control and power over a business entity.[14] There is thus, as Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection enjoins,[15] | |||||
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2010-03-17 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In this connection, PHILCONSA's urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is timely and appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of the framers.[73] | |||||
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2009-12-21 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent,[1] for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.[2] Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.[3] Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.[4] | |||||