This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2008-04-14 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The second preliminary issue we need to address is the matter of this Court's jurisdiction in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45. It should be noted that our jurisdiction in such cases is limited only to questions of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. This doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases.[9] As such, the findings of fact of the CA are binding and conclusive upon this Court. However, this rule is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions. Factual findings may be reviewed in a case when the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC are in conflict with those of the CA.[10] In this case, the LA and the NLRC held that respondents did not comply with the notice requirement; the CA found otherwise. Thus, although the instant petition involves a question of fact, that is, whether or not the notice requirement was met, we can still rule on it. | |||||
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2008-02-04 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Nothing prevents the Court of Appeals from adopting the factual findings and conclusion of the deputy ombudsman on the ground that the findings and conclusions were based on substantial evidence. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. It is settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.[30] Guided by this principle, the appellate court correctly affirmed the finding of guilt for grave misconduct and dishonesty. | |||||
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2007-12-19 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Verily, RA 7942, similar to PD 463, confers exclusive and primary jurisdiction on the DENR Secretary to approve mineral agreements, which is purely an administrative function within the scope of his powers and authority. In exercising such exclusive primary jurisdiction, the DENR Secretary, through the MGB, has the best competence to determine to whom mineral agreements are granted. Settled is the rule that the courts will defer to the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in the matters assigned to them pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Administrative decisions on matter within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.[63] Unless it is shown that the then DENR Secretary has acted in a wanton, whimsical, or oppressive manner, giving undue advantage to a party or for an illegal consideration and similar reasons, this Court cannot look into or review the wisdom of the exercise of such discretion. Blue Ridge failed in this regard. | |||||
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2007-10-05 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| On the merits of the case, suffice it to say that the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the SEC are controlling on the reviewing authority. Indeed, the rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority.[56] | |||||
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2007-07-31 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Our Constitution enshrines the policy that "public office is a public trust [and all] public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency."[41] Public office therefore is given utmost regard, and the highest standards of service are expected from it. We have categorically pronounced that "the nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the 1987 Constitution and oft-repeated in our case law are not mere rhetorical words, not to be taken as idealistic sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds."[42] | |||||
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2005-06-08 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Clearly, the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves was well within the prerogative of the said respondents DECS officials. It behooves the Court to refrain from unduly interfering with the exercise of such administrative prerogative. After all, it is well settled that administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.[25] None of these vices has been shown as having attended the designation of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves. | |||||