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FERNANDO GABATIN v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES

This case has been cited 21 times or more.

	GR No. 191667 2015-04-22	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
"An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable."[37] Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[38]
	GR No. 196750 2015-03-11	MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA v. CORONACION PARILLA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.[30] Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[31]
	GR No. 202205 2013-03-06	FOREST HILLS GOLF v. VERTEX SALES BRION, J.
As correctly pointed out by Forest Hills, it was not a party to the sale even though the subject of the sale was its share of stock. The corporation whose shares of stock are the subject of a transfer transaction (through sale, assignment, donation, or any other mode of conveyance) need not be a party to the transaction, as may be inferred from the terms of Section 63 of the Corporation Code. However, to bind the corporation as well as third parties, it is necessary that the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. In the present case, the parties to the sale of the share were FEGDI as the seller and Vertex as the buyer (after it succeeded RSACC). As party to the sale, FEGDI is the one who may appeal the ruling rescinding the sale. The remedy of appeal is available to a party who has "a present interest in the subject matter of the litigation and [is] aggrieved or prejudiced by the judgment. A party, in turn, is deemed aggrieved or prejudiced when his interest, recognized by law in the subject matter of the lawsuit, is injuriously affected by the judgment, order or decree."[17] The rescission of the sale does not in any way prejudice Forest Hills in such a manner that its interest in the subject matter the share of stock is injuriously affected. Thus, Forest Hills is in no position to appeal the ruling rescinding the sale of the share. Since FEGDI, as party to the sale, filed no appeal against its rescission, we consider as final the CA's ruling on this matter.
	GR No. 182431 2013-02-27	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. ESTHER ANSON RIVERA PEREZ, J.
The purpose of A.O. No. 13 is to compensate the landowners for unearned interests. Had they been paid in 1972 when the Government Support Price (GSP) for rice and corn was valued at P35.00 and P31.00, respectively, and such amounts were deposited in a bank, they would have earned a compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus, if the [Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator] [(]PARAD[)] used the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x Average Gross Production (AGP) x P35.00 or P31.00) could be multiplied by (1.06) to determine the value of the land plus the additional 6% compounded interest it would have earned from 1972.[30]
	GR No. 167735 2012-04-18	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SALVADOR ENCINAS BRION, J.
The "taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding."[35] In computing the just compensation for expropriation proceedings, the RTC should take into consideration the "value of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of judgment."[36] "The 'time of taking' is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic."[37]
	GR No. 184406 2012-03-14	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. PERFECTO OBIAS PEREZ, J.
On 31 January 2008, the appellate court vacated the decision of the trial court. It relied heavily on Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines[9] ruling wherein this Court fixed the rate of the government support price (GSP) for one cavan of palay at P35.00, the price of the palay at the time of the taking of the land. Following the formula, "Land Value= 2.5 multiplied by the Average Gross Production (AGP) multiplied by the Government Support Price (GSP)," provided by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. 228, the value of the total area taken will be P371,015.20 plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% interest per annum, compounded annually, starting 21 October 1972, until fully paid. [10]
	GR No. 171101 2011-11-22	HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL VELASCO JR., J.
Echoing the stance of DAR and PARC, AMBALA submits that the operative fact doctrine should only be made to apply in the extreme case in which equity demands it, which allegedly is not in the instant case.[6] It further argues that there would be no undue harshness or injury to HLI in case lands are actually distributed to the farmworkers, and that the decision which orders the farmworkers to choose whether to remain as stockholders of HLI or to opt for land distribution would result in inequity and prejudice to the farmworkers.[7] The foregoing views are also similarly shared by Rene Galang and AMBALA, through the PILC.[8] In addition, FARM posits that the option given to the FWBs is equivalent to an option for HLI to retain land in direct violation of RA 6657.[9]
	GR No. 161834 2010-08-11	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. HEIR OF TRINIDAD S. VDA. DE ARIETA VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Under the law, the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking.[12] Once an expropriation proceeding or the acquisition of private agricultural lands is commenced by the DAR, the indispensable role of LBP begins. EO No. 405, issued on June 14, 1990, provides that the DAR is required to make use of the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the LBP as the latter is primarily responsible for the determination of the land valuation and compensation. In fact, the LBP can disagree with the decision of the DAR in the determination of just compensation, and bring the matter to the RTC designated as SAC for final determination of just compensation.[13]
	GR No. 180803 2009-10-23	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. J. L. JOCSON CARPIO MORALES, J.
Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines[21] reiterated the settled rule that a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, is the appropriate mode of appeal from decisions of RTCs acting as SACs. In Gabatin, the Court sustained the appellate court's assumption of jurisdiction over an appeal from the SAC even if its dismissal had been sought on the ground that the issues presented before the appellate court were purely legal in nature. Also apropos is this Court's ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon:[22]
	GR No. 168453 2009-03-13	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. HERNANDO T. CHICO
As to the legal basis of just compensation, we hold that the applicable law is R.A. No. 6657. Our recent ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pacita Agricultural Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., etc., et al.[41] is enlightening. Therein, the Court made a comparative analysis of cases that confronted the issue of whether properties covered by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, for which the landowners had yet to be paid, would be compensated under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 or under the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657. We observed that in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines[42] - a case which LBP invokes in this controversy - the Court declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just compensation should be the time when the land was taken, i.e., in 1972, applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228. However, the Court also noted that after Gabatin, the Court had decided several cases in which it found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the property at the time of payment. These cases are Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[43] Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform[44] and Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[45] including the earlier cases of Office of the President v. Court of Appeals[46] and Paris v. Alfeche.[47]
	GR No. 177607 2009-01-19	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. PACITA AGRICULTURAL MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Petitioner challenges the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it retroactively applied Republic Act No. 6657 to the instant case, in spite of the fact that the said law does not provide for any retroactive application. Petitioner argues that the 12 December 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals runs afoul of the pronouncement laid down in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines.[33] In said case, the Court held that the taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program was deemed effected on 21 October 1972, when the landowners were deprived of ownership over their lands in favor of qualified beneficiaries, pursuant to Executive Order No. 228 and by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. Hence, in computing the value of the land for the payment of just compensation to the landowner, the time of taking in 1972 should be made the basis. In such event, petitioner avers that no injustice will be inflicted upon the respondent, inasmuch as the latter is entitled to receive the increment of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded annually pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 13, Series of 1994. Finally, petitioner contends that, although Section 75 of Republic Act No. 6657[34] states that Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 shall have suppletory effect, these two executive issuances are not in any way inferior to Republic Act No. 6657, nor have they been superseded by the statute.
	GR No. 167809 2008-11-27	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. JOSEFINA R. DUMLAO REYES, R.T., J.
In Meneses, the Court compared the conflicting rulings in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[60] cited by petitioner, and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad.[61] This Court affirmed Natividad, stating that it would be more equitable to apply the same due to the circumstances obtaining, i.e. the more than 30-year delay in the payment of just compensation.
	GR No. 174971 2008-10-15	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. AMS FARMING CORPORATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Without the signature of the LBP President, there was simply no contract between Sharp and the Government. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1989, was incomplete and therefore had no binding effect at all. Consequently, Sharp cannot claim any legal right thereunder that it can validly assert in a petition for mandamus. (Emphasis supplied.) The issue of whether LBP can file an appeal on its own, separately and independently of the DAR, in land valuation and just compensation cases, had been squarely addressed by the Court in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[22] where it ruled:It must be observed that once an expropriation proceeding for the acquisition of private agricultural lands is commenced by the DAR, the indispensable role of Land Bank begins.
	GR No. 180557 2008-09-26	HEIRS OF ROQUE F. TABUENA v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
Once an expropriation proceeding for the acquisition of private agricultural lands is commenced by the DAR, the indispensable role of LBP begins,[21] which clearly shows that there would never be a judicial determination of just compensation absent respondent LBP's participation. Logically, it follows that respondent is an indispensable party in an action for the determination of just compensation in cases arising from agrarian reform program;[22] as such, it can file an appeal independently of DAR.
	GR NO. 166777 2007-07-10	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. SPS. VICENTE M. ESTANISLAO AND LUZ B. HERMOSA CARPIO MORALES, J.
x x x x Petitioner, citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[20] contends that the taking of the subject lots was deemed effected on October 21, 1972, when respondents were, under P.D. No. 27 deprived of ownership over the subject lands in favor of qualified beneficiaries.[21]
	GR NO. 162779 2007-06-15	HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN v. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE QUISUMBING, J.
As a rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is reckoned from the time of taking.[14] In this case, however, application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice. Note that the ATO had been using petitioners' property as airport since 1948 without having instituted the proper expropriation proceedings. To peg the value of the property at the time of taking in 1948, despite the exponential increase in its value considering the lapse of over half a century, would be iniquitous. We cannot allow the ATO to conveniently invoke the right of eminent domain to take advantage of the ridiculously low value of the property at the time of taking that it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of petitioners.
	GR NO. 157753 2007-02-12	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. JUAN H. IMPERIAL QUISUMBING, J.
We must stress, at this juncture, that the taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding.[24] In a number of cases, we have stated that just compensation in expropriation proceedings represents the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. To compensate is to render something which is equal in value to that taken or received.[25]
	GR NO. 170220 2006-11-20	JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously computed. Citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[21] it held that the formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government Support Price. Specifically, it held that the value of the government support price for the corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, on October 21, 1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of the taking in 1972.
	GR NO. 156304 2006-10-23	ANACLETO R. MENESES v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Respondent correctly cited the case of Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[33] where the Court ruled that "in computing the just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking [or October 21, 1972, the effectivity date of P.D. No. 27], not at the time of the rendition of judgment, which should be taken into consideration." Under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, the following formula is used to compute the land value for palay: LV (land value) = 2.5 x AGP x GSP x (1.06)n
	GR NO. 160334 2006-09-11	GUENTER BACH v. ONGKIKO KALAW MANHIT CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Respondent was likewise able to annotate a notice[21] of lis pendens on the property of Spouses Bach in Pasig City covered by TCT No. 48223, thereby preventing disposition of the property by Luzviminda Bach;