This case has been cited 5 times or more.
2014-09-08 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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Execution must always conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the decision, because the only portion thereof that may be the subject of execution is that which is precisely ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion; whatever is in the body of the decision can only be considered as part of the reasons or conclusions and serves as a guide in determining the ratio decidendi.[1] | |||||
2012-12-10 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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The Court, however, must clarify that the merits of the parties' arguments as to the propriety of the issuance of the Second Partial Award are not in issue here. Courts are generally without power to amend or overrule merely because of disagreement with matters of law or facts determined by the arbitrators. They will not review the findings of law and fact contained in an award, and will not undertake to substitute their judgment for that of the arbitrators. A contrary rule would make an arbitration award the commencement, not the end, of litigation.[101] It is the finding of evident partiality which constitutes legal ground for vacating the Second Partial Award and not the Arbitration Tribunal's application of the ICC Rules adopting the "contractual approach" tackled in Secomb's article. | |||||
2011-05-31 |
BRION, J. |
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[26] G.R. No. 148318, November 22, 2004, 443 SCRA 342. | |||||
2009-07-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, and later on affirmed in more recent cases,[24] when the judgment awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent of a forbearance of credit. Thus, from the time the judgment becomes final until its full satisfaction, the applicable rate of legal interest shall be twelve percent (12%). |