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ARNEL GABRIEL v. CA

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR No. 195671 2015-01-21	ROGELIO J. GONZAGA v. PEOPLE PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio's act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior.As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.[43] Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes negligence.[44] Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.
	GR No. 147437 2009-05-08	LARRY V. CAMINOS v. PEOPLE TINGA, J.
Speeding, moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to exercise such ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered on the road. What is reasonable speed, of course, is necessarily subjective as it must conform to the peculiarities of a given case but in all cases, it is that which will enable the driver to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.[54] This standard of reasonableness is actually contained in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136. It states:SEC. 35. Restriction as to speed. (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered [55] which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. [56]
	GR No. 176169 2008-11-14	ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR v. PEOPLE TINGA, J.
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that the real nature of the crime charged is determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated these being conclusions of law but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. What controls is not the designation but the description of the offense charged. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged is. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the body of the information, in the manner stated, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.[14]
	GR NOS. 153760-61 2006-10-16	TEODORICO MANZANARES v. PEOPLE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
A- Still little by little, sir.[48] By his own admission, it is crystal clear that petitioner Manzanares was caught by surprise when the passenger jeepney he intended to overtake started moving alongside him causing him to hesitate and to step on his brakepedal. But as he was running at such a fast pace, the momentum of the Isuzu truck overpowered his brakes such that the truck still continued with its motion until it bumped the passenger jeepney driven by Jesus Basallo right at the edge of the asphalted portion of the highway. The location of the debris, as illustrated by the sketch prepared by Patrolman Macapagal, and his testimony confirm that there were more pieces of broken glass on the shoulder of the road than there were on the highway itself. Evidence tending to illustrate the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the accident tends to throw light on the issue of speed and direction of the vehicle's movements prior to, and at the same time of, the accident.[49] This confirms that only a small portion of the passenger jeepney was positioned on the asphalted portion of the highway itself while the remainder of its body was still on the shoulder of the road. Given petitioner's testimony that the two passenger jeepneys were far from one another, there was more than ample road space within which petitioner Manzanares could have maneuvered the Isuzu truck instead of bumping into the passenger jeepney and pinning Jesus Basallo to his death. The fact that he was unable to do so and in the end lost control of the Isuzu truck indicate that petitioner Manzanares was unreasonably fast in traversing that portion of the road despite his insistence that he was driving slowly because his speedometer was not functioning.[50]