This case has been cited 6 times or more.
2016-01-28 |
REYES, J. |
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"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it."[31] The Court agrees with the CA in its decision which held that "a new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was not presented due to its negligence. Likewise, the purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against [the petitioner's] substantive rights do not exist."[32] | |||||
2015-04-08 |
LEONEN, J. |
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Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"[76] the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom."[77] The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary[78] and summary[79] in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty."[80] | |||||
2013-07-17 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,[16] Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause should be ultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan's transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.[17] We agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy.[18] | |||||
2010-06-29 |
PEREZ, J. |
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The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.[18] Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.[19] | |||||
2005-06-21 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment.[33] However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.[34] | |||||
2005-06-15 |
CARPIO, J. |
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In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence on DNA testing: People v. Yatar[38] and In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.[39] In Yatar, a match existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample given by appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejo's footsteps, affirmed the conviction of appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape with homicide. In De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape. The Court ruled that a difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the victim's child does not preclude the convict-petitioner's commission of rape. |