Lawyerly

GR No. 176707

2010-02-17

CORONA, J.

Note that the foregoing provision is a specific remedy as against CSC decisions involving its administrative function, that is, on matters involving "appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service,"[20] as opposed to its quasi-judicial function where it adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law.[21]

GR No. 176707

2010-02-17

ARLIN B. OBIASCA v. JEANE O. BASALLOTE

CORONA, J.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.[22] In Orosa v. Roa,[23] the Court ruled that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts.[24] While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to certain exceptions,[25] these are not present in this case.

GR No. 177795

2009-06-19

LEAH M. NAZARENO v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The CSC, in carrying out its powers and functions, has a three-tiered organizational structure, i.e., the CSC-FO, the CSC-RO, and the CSC Proper acting as a collegial body. The appointing authority[33] or the appointees themselves[34] may file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal of the disapproval of appointments by the CSC-FO to the CSC-RO, and by the CSC-RO to the CSC Proper. Until the disapproval of the appointments by the CSC-FO and CSC-RO is affirmed by the CSC Proper, it shall not be considered final and executory. Stated differently, the appointments shall remain effective until they are disapproved by the CSC Proper. In the meantime, there shall be no obstacle to the concerned appointees continuing to render public service; and to receiving salary for the actual services they have rendered during the period, based on the "no work, no pay" policy.[35]

GR No. 175220

2009-02-12

WILLIAM C. DAGAN v. PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION

TINGA, J.

As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice 7and hearing.[40] In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,[41] this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained.[42]

GR No. 138437

2008-11-14

RAMON J. QUISUMBING v. SANDIGANBAYAN

CARPIO MORALES, J.

"Interest" within the meaning of the immediately-quoted Rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the Rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court as a party-plaintiff in an action;[21] if he does, the suit is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.[22]

GR No. 163443

2008-11-11

LIZA M. QUIROG v. GOVERNOR ERICO B. AUMENTADO

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

In the recent case of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,[27] the Court declared that both the appointing authority and the appointee are equally real parties in interest who have the requisite legal standing to bring an action challenging a CSC disapproval of an appointment. In said case, we held that:The CSC's disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authority's discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the appointing authority to request reconsideration or appeal.

GR No. 164710

2007-09-28

RONALD C. JAUCIAN v. GEN. REYNALDO G. WYCOCO

QUISUMBING, J.

The power of appointment involves considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.[16] The CSC is not authorized to curtail or diminish the exercise of discretion of the appointing power on the nature or kind of appointment to be extended.[17] The CSC, by ignoring or annulling, or supplanting with its own, Director Opinion's appointment of petitioner on a coterminous basis, has acted beyond its authority. This being the case, petitioner cannot claim that he has been illegally dismissed and his employment status downgraded. He was no longer employed at the time the coterminous appointment was handed to him.

GR NO. 168484

2007-07-12

LEAH M. NAZARENO v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE

NACHURA, J.

The difference between "real party-in-interest" and "legal standing" has been thoroughly explained by this Court in the cases of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission[33] and Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,[34] in this wise:Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence, the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

GR No. 144322

2007-02-06

METROPOLITAN BANK v. NATIONAL WAGES

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

In the issuance of the assailed Wage Order, respondent RTWPB did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial capacity, or ministerial capacity. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power under R.A. No. 6727. It was issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative power. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government.[29]

GR NO. 152214

2006-09-19

EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT v. DFA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

It bears emphasizing that administrative bodies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi- legislative and the quasi-judicial.[13] In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,[14] we discussed the nature of these powers to be -

GR NO. 161298

2006-01-31

SPS. ANT v. VICTOR LIMBARING

PANGANIBAN, CJ.

Interest within the meaning of the Rules means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.[31] One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action.[32] When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.[33]

GR NO. 161942

2005-10-13

JOSE M. CARINGAL v. PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

There is no question that petitioner does not possess the required CES eligibility. Hence, he has no security of tenure as his appointment is merely temporary. To be sure, his appointment did not attain permanency. Such being the case, it can be withdrawn from him anytime without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.[11]

GR NO. 148196

2005-09-30

BPI FAMILY BANK v. EDGARDO BUENAVENTURA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

It is elementary that it is only in the name of a real party-in-interest that a civil suit may be prosecuted. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[16] One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action.[17] To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.[18] Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract.[19]

GR NO. 157950

2005-06-08

LIBRADA D. TAPISPISAN v. CA

CALLEJO, SR., J.

The appointing power is vested in the Department Head/Secretary.[12] Such power, however, may be delegated to the regional director subject to the approval, revision, modification and reversal of the Department Secretary.[13] It is not disputed that the appointments of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as Head Teacher III and Master Teacher II, respectively, had been made by the appropriate appointing authority. Further, such appointments were duly attested by the CSC, which, under the Constitution, is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service.[14] The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete.[15] Accordingly, the appointments of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as Head Teacher III and Master Teacher II, respectively, are entitled to respect by the Court:... [I]n the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority.[16]

GR NOS. 161166-67

2005-02-03

MAYOR RHUSTOM L. DAGADAG v. MICHAEL C. TONGNAWA

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules, means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.[6]

	GR No. 176707 2010-02-17	ARLIN B. OBIASCA v. JEANE O. BASALLOTE CORONA, J.
Note that the foregoing provision is a specific remedy as against CSC decisions involving its administrative function, that is, on matters involving "appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service,"[20] as opposed to its quasi-judicial function where it adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law.[21]
	GR No. 176707 2010-02-17	ARLIN B. OBIASCA v. JEANE O. BASALLOTE CORONA, J.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.[22] In Orosa v. Roa,[23] the Court ruled that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts.[24] While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to certain exceptions,[25] these are not present in this case.
	GR No. 177795 2009-06-19	LEAH M. NAZARENO v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The CSC, in carrying out its powers and functions, has a three-tiered organizational structure, i.e., the CSC-FO, the CSC-RO, and the CSC Proper acting as a collegial body. The appointing authority[33] or the appointees themselves[34] may file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal of the disapproval of appointments by the CSC-FO to the CSC-RO, and by the CSC-RO to the CSC Proper. Until the disapproval of the appointments by the CSC-FO and CSC-RO is affirmed by the CSC Proper, it shall not be considered final and executory. Stated differently, the appointments shall remain effective until they are disapproved by the CSC Proper. In the meantime, there shall be no obstacle to the concerned appointees continuing to render public service; and to receiving salary for the actual services they have rendered during the period, based on the "no work, no pay" policy.[35]
	GR No. 175220 2009-02-12	WILLIAM C. DAGAN v. PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION TINGA, J.
As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice 7and hearing.[40] In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,[41] this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained.[42]
	GR No. 138437 2008-11-14	RAMON J. QUISUMBING v. SANDIGANBAYAN CARPIO MORALES, J.
"Interest" within the meaning of the immediately-quoted Rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the Rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court as a party-plaintiff in an action;[21] if he does, the suit is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.[22]
	GR No. 163443 2008-11-11	LIZA M. QUIROG v. GOVERNOR ERICO B. AUMENTADO LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In the recent case of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,[27] the Court declared that both the appointing authority and the appointee are equally real parties in interest who have the requisite legal standing to bring an action challenging a CSC disapproval of an appointment. In said case, we held that:The CSC's disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authority's discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the appointing authority to request reconsideration or appeal.
	GR No. 164710 2007-09-28	RONALD C. JAUCIAN v. GEN. REYNALDO G. WYCOCO QUISUMBING, J.
The power of appointment involves considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.[16] The CSC is not authorized to curtail or diminish the exercise of discretion of the appointing power on the nature or kind of appointment to be extended.[17] The CSC, by ignoring or annulling, or supplanting with its own, Director Opinion's appointment of petitioner on a coterminous basis, has acted beyond its authority. This being the case, petitioner cannot claim that he has been illegally dismissed and his employment status downgraded. He was no longer employed at the time the coterminous appointment was handed to him.
	GR NO. 168484 2007-07-12	LEAH M. NAZARENO v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE NACHURA, J.
The difference between "real party-in-interest" and "legal standing" has been thoroughly explained by this Court in the cases of Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission[33] and Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,[34] in this wise:Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence, the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
	GR No. 144322 2007-02-06	METROPOLITAN BANK v. NATIONAL WAGES AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In the issuance of the assailed Wage Order, respondent RTWPB did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial capacity, or ministerial capacity. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power under R.A. No. 6727. It was issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative power. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government.[29]
	GR NO. 152214 2006-09-19	EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT v. DFA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It bears emphasizing that administrative bodies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi- legislative and the quasi-judicial.[13] In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,[14] we discussed the nature of these powers to be -
	GR NO. 161298 2006-01-31	SPS. ANT v. VICTOR LIMBARING PANGANIBAN, CJ.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.[31] One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action.[32] When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.[33]
	GR NO. 161942 2005-10-13	JOSE M. CARINGAL v. PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
There is no question that petitioner does not possess the required CES eligibility. Hence, he has no security of tenure as his appointment is merely temporary. To be sure, his appointment did not attain permanency. Such being the case, it can be withdrawn from him anytime without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.[11]
	GR NO. 148196 2005-09-30	BPI FAMILY BANK v. EDGARDO BUENAVENTURA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
It is elementary that it is only in the name of a real party-in-interest that a civil suit may be prosecuted. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[16] One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action.[17] To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.[18] Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract.[19]
	GR NO. 157950 2005-06-08	LIBRADA D. TAPISPISAN v. CA CALLEJO, SR., J.
The appointing power is vested in the Department Head/Secretary.[12] Such power, however, may be delegated to the regional director subject to the approval, revision, modification and reversal of the Department Secretary.[13] It is not disputed that the appointments of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as Head Teacher III and Master Teacher II, respectively, had been made by the appropriate appointing authority. Further, such appointments were duly attested by the CSC, which, under the Constitution, is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service.[14] The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete.[15] Accordingly, the appointments of respondents Rumbaoa and Teves as Head Teacher III and Master Teacher II, respectively, are entitled to respect by the Court:... [I]n the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority.[16]
	GR NOS. 161166-67 2005-02-03	MAYOR RHUSTOM L. DAGADAG v. MICHAEL C. TONGNAWA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules, means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.[6]

FRANCISCO ABELLA JR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION