Lawyerly

GR No. 198389

2013-12-11

REYES, J.

Third, Roallos failed to substantiate his claim that his right to speedy trial was violated. The right to speedy trial is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.[24] In order for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: first, that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and second, that there was no more delay that is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.[25]

GR No. 191411

2013-07-15

RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time.[29] Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.[30] This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan[31] (Corpuz) illumined: A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

GR Nos. 153304-05

2012-02-07

PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN

BRION, J.

Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused's demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[25] Mere allegations of grave abuse of discretion, however, are not enough to establish this ground; so also, mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient.[26] On the petitioner lies the burden of demonstrating, plainly and distinctly, all facts essential to establish its right to a writ of certiorari.[27]

GR No. 175289

2011-08-31

CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN v. PEOPLE

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily "involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation."[42]

GR No. 151911

2011-07-25

EDGAR PAYUMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

MENDOZA, J.

All told, the Court finds and so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it nullified the November 27, 1998 Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal Case No. 4219. There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent court, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.[46] Accordingly, the assailed Resolution dated October 24, 2001 must be set aside.

GR No. 162206

2010-11-17

MONICO V. JACOB v. SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan[17] is a case originating from exactly the same factual background as the case at bar. Therein petitioners Marialen C. Corpuz and Antonio H. Roman, Sr. were officers of FILSYN Corporation, one of the BOI-registered firms that assigned TCCs to Petron; and were among the accused in Criminal Case No. 25922. They filed a separate Petition for Certiorari before us assailing the Resolutions dated February 4, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division and December 12, 2003 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division.

GR No. 173637

2009-04-21

DANTE T. TAN v. PEOPLE

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,[25] the Court had occasion to state -

GR NO. 129098

2006-12-06

AMELIA CABRERA v. MANUEL LAPID

TINGA, J.

Grave abuse of discretion should be differentiated from an error in judgment. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[25]

GR NO. 159098

2006-10-27

SPS. HENRY AND ROSARIO UY v. JUDGE ARSENIO P. ADRIANO

CALLEJO, SR., J.

The same observation was made in Valencia v. Sandiganbayan.[67] Here, the Court noted the haphazard manner by which the prosecutor handled the litigation for the State when he rested the case without adducing evidence for the prosecution and simply relying on the Joint Stipulation of Facts, which the accused did not even sign before its submission to the Sandiganbayan. In allowing the prosecution to present additional evidence and in dismissing the claim of the accused that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated, we ruled: As significant as the right of an accused to a speedy trial is the right of the State to prosecute people who violate its penal laws. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays x x x [T]o erroneously put premium on the right to speedy trial in the instant case and deny the prosecution's prayer to adduce additional evidence would logically result in the dismissal of the case for the State. There is no difference between an order outrightly dismissing the case and an order allowing the eventual dismissal thereof. Both would set a dangerous precedent which enables the accused, who may be guilty, to go free without having been validly tried, thereby infringing the interest of the society.[68] Certainly, the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. It should not operate in depriving the State of its inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all those who approach the bar of justice is afforded fair opportunity to present their side.[69] For it is not only the State; more so, the offended party who is entitled to due process in criminal cases.[70] In essence, the right to a speedy trial does not preclude the people's equally important right to public justice.[71] Thus, as succinctly decreed in State v. McTague:[72] The constitutional and statutory provisions for a speedy trial are for the protection of the defendant, but that does not mean that the state is the only one that may initiate action. There is really no reason for the courts to free an accused simply because a dilatory prosecutor has "gone to sleep at the switch" while the defendant and his counsel rest in silence. These solicitous provisions are not to be used as offensive weapons, but are for the benefit of defendants who claim their protection. They are a shield, and they "must not be left hanging on the wall of the armory." It is for the protection of personal rights, not to embarrass the administration of the criminal law nor to defeat public justice. Be that as it may, the conduct of the City Prosecutor and the MTC must not pass without admonition. This Court must emphasize that the State, through the court and the public prosecutor, has the absolute duty to insure that the criminal justice system is consistent with due process and the constitutional rights of the accused. Society has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and the society's representatives are the ones who should protect that interest. The trial court and the prosecution are not without responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal cases. The burden for trial promptness is not solely upon the defense. The right to a speedy trial is constitutionally guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant and the knowledgeable.[73]

GR NO. 156013

2006-07-25

ROBERTO P. DE GUZMAN v. HERNANDO B. PEREZ

CORONA, J.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which amounts to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.[17] Where it is not shown that the findings complained of are wholly devoid of evidentiary support or that they are patently erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, the findings must be sustained.[18]

GR NO. 145945

2006-06-27

PEOPLE v. VICTOR SUBIDA

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Indeed, the law and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure have set timelines for the completion of trials of criminal cases which must be followed except when extensions are granted by the Supreme Court. It must be borne in mind, however, that while justice must be administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is that the proceedings must be orderly expeditious and not merely speedy. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift and deliberate, but it is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances.[29] The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibility or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertions from the courts or the prosecution, or even the accused or his counsel.[30]

GR NO. 165996

2005-10-17

RODOLFO G. VALENCIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

In light of the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan was therefore correct in allowing the State to adduce additional evidence. The State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Special Prosecutor.[31] A contrary ruling would result in a void proceedings.

GR NO. 163108

2005-02-23

GLENN CABALLES Y CHUA v. CA

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v. Sandiganbayan,[50] the Court had the occasion to state

	GR No. 198389 2013-12-11	VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES v. PEOPLE REYES, J.
Third, Roallos failed to substantiate his claim that his right to speedy trial was violated. The right to speedy trial is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.[24] In order for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: first, that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and second, that there was no more delay that is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.[25]
	GR No. 191411 2013-07-15	RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA v. SANDIGANBAYAN PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time.[29] Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.[30] This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan[31] (Corpuz) illumined: A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
	GR Nos. 153304-05 2012-02-07	PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN BRION, J.
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused's demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[25] Mere allegations of grave abuse of discretion, however, are not enough to establish this ground; so also, mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient.[26] On the petitioner lies the burden of demonstrating, plainly and distinctly, all facts essential to establish its right to a writ of certiorari.[27]
	GR No. 175289 2011-08-31	CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN v. PEOPLE DEL CASTILLO, J.
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily "involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation."[42]
	GR No. 151911 2011-07-25	EDGAR PAYUMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN MENDOZA, J.
All told, the Court finds and so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it nullified the November 27, 1998 Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal Case No. 4219. There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent court, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.[46] Accordingly, the assailed Resolution dated October 24, 2001 must be set aside.
	GR No. 162206 2010-11-17	MONICO V. JACOB v. SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan[17] is a case originating from exactly the same factual background as the case at bar. Therein petitioners Marialen C. Corpuz and Antonio H. Roman, Sr. were officers of FILSYN Corporation, one of the BOI-registered firms that assigned TCCs to Petron; and were among the accused in Criminal Case No. 25922. They filed a separate Petition for Certiorari before us assailing the Resolutions dated February 4, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division and December 12, 2003 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division.
	GR No. 173637 2009-04-21	DANTE T. TAN v. PEOPLE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,[25] the Court had occasion to state -
	GR NO. 129098 2006-12-06	AMELIA CABRERA v. MANUEL LAPID TINGA, J.
Grave abuse of discretion should be differentiated from an error in judgment. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[25]
	GR NO. 159098 2006-10-27	SPS. HENRY AND ROSARIO UY v. JUDGE ARSENIO P. ADRIANO CALLEJO, SR., J.
The same observation was made in Valencia v. Sandiganbayan.[67] Here, the Court noted the haphazard manner by which the prosecutor handled the litigation for the State when he rested the case without adducing evidence for the prosecution and simply relying on the Joint Stipulation of Facts, which the accused did not even sign before its submission to the Sandiganbayan. In allowing the prosecution to present additional evidence and in dismissing the claim of the accused that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated, we ruled: As significant as the right of an accused to a speedy trial is the right of the State to prosecute people who violate its penal laws. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays x x x [T]o erroneously put premium on the right to speedy trial in the instant case and deny the prosecution's prayer to adduce additional evidence would logically result in the dismissal of the case for the State. There is no difference between an order outrightly dismissing the case and an order allowing the eventual dismissal thereof. Both would set a dangerous precedent which enables the accused, who may be guilty, to go free without having been validly tried, thereby infringing the interest of the society.[68] Certainly, the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. It should not operate in depriving the State of its inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all those who approach the bar of justice is afforded fair opportunity to present their side.[69] For it is not only the State; more so, the offended party who is entitled to due process in criminal cases.[70] In essence, the right to a speedy trial does not preclude the people's equally important right to public justice.[71] Thus, as succinctly decreed in State v. McTague:[72] The constitutional and statutory provisions for a speedy trial are for the protection of the defendant, but that does not mean that the state is the only one that may initiate action. There is really no reason for the courts to free an accused simply because a dilatory prosecutor has "gone to sleep at the switch" while the defendant and his counsel rest in silence. These solicitous provisions are not to be used as offensive weapons, but are for the benefit of defendants who claim their protection. They are a shield, and they "must not be left hanging on the wall of the armory." It is for the protection of personal rights, not to embarrass the administration of the criminal law nor to defeat public justice. Be that as it may, the conduct of the City Prosecutor and the MTC must not pass without admonition. This Court must emphasize that the State, through the court and the public prosecutor, has the absolute duty to insure that the criminal justice system is consistent with due process and the constitutional rights of the accused. Society has a particular interest in bringing swift prosecutions, and the society's representatives are the ones who should protect that interest. The trial court and the prosecution are not without responsibility for the expeditious trial of criminal cases. The burden for trial promptness is not solely upon the defense. The right to a speedy trial is constitutionally guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant and the knowledgeable.[73]
	GR NO. 156013 2006-07-25	ROBERTO P. DE GUZMAN v. HERNANDO B. PEREZ CORONA, J.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which amounts to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.[17] Where it is not shown that the findings complained of are wholly devoid of evidentiary support or that they are patently erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, the findings must be sustained.[18]
	GR NO. 145945 2006-06-27	PEOPLE v. VICTOR SUBIDA CALLEJO, SR., J.
Indeed, the law and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure have set timelines for the completion of trials of criminal cases which must be followed except when extensions are granted by the Supreme Court. It must be borne in mind, however, that while justice must be administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is that the proceedings must be orderly expeditious and not merely speedy. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift and deliberate, but it is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances.[29] The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibility or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertions from the courts or the prosecution, or even the accused or his counsel.[30]
	GR NO. 165996 2005-10-17	RODOLFO G. VALENCIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In light of the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan was therefore correct in allowing the State to adduce additional evidence. The State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Special Prosecutor.[31] A contrary ruling would result in a void proceedings.
	GR NO. 163108 2005-02-23	GLENN CABALLES Y CHUA v. CA CALLEJO, SR., J.
Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v. Sandiganbayan,[50] the Court had the occasion to state

MARIALEN C. CORPUZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN