This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2007-03-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| It may be that REM-102299-10723 arose from Santos's claim for refund under the contract of cancellation, which is a cause of action ordinarily cognizable by the HLURB under Sec. 1 (b), P.D. No. 1344. But then, the same provision expressly qualifies that the claim for refund, to be cognizable by the HLURB, must involve a subdivision or condominium property and that it be filed by a "subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman." In Lacson Hermanas, Inc. v. Heirs of Cenon Ignacio,[53] we held that the regular courts, not the HLURB, have jurisdiction over actions to enforce a contract to sell involving real property which is not alleged nor established to be a subdivision or condominium property. Also, in Kakilala v. Faraon,[54] the buyer of a real property sued the seller before the HLURB for "Specific Performance for Non-development and Damages." While non-development falls under Sec. 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1344, we held that the HLURB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because it was never alleged that the property involved is a subvision or condominium and that the parties are subdivision or condominium buyer and developer/owner. | |||||
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2004-11-23 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Both petitioners and respondent failed to attach in their pleadings filed before the trial court, a copy of the Contract To Sell to show the terms and conditions embodied therein. A mere reference to the above-quoted paragraph, standing alone, does not establish that the subject lot is a subdivision lot. What it merely states is that petitioners may invoke the grounds of lack of development of respondent's property as a regular subdivision project and within the time limit set, if such requirements are applicable to the subject lot, for voluntarily desisting from further payments and their installments paid would not be forfeited. There is not even a certainty that those grounds apply to the subject lot. In fact, the use of the phrase "regular subdivision project" does not automatically make the instant case fall under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. In Sps. Kakilala vs. Faraon,[17] notwithstanding the allegations of petitioners in their complaint that the subject lot is "a subdivision lot" in a "subdivision project," we held that such allegations were not sufficient to vest the HLURB of jurisdiction over the case, thus:Jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer. Hence, the jurisdictional issue involved here shall be determined on the basis of the allegations of petitioner's complaint before the HLURB. Petitioners simply alleged therein that the subject lot is "a subdivision lot" in "a subdivision project." Under Section 2(d) and (e) of PD 957, "subdivision project" and "subdivision lot" are defined as follows: | |||||