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PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE v. ANGELITA S. GRAMAJE

This case has been cited 10 times or more.

2010-10-06
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Managerial prerogatives, however, are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice.[25]  In the case of Blue Dairy Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[26] we described in more detail the limitations on the right of management to transfer employees: But, like other rights, there are limits thereto. The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. In particular, the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal, which has been defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving a demotion in rank and diminution in pay. Likewise, constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued employment.[27]
2009-04-30
TINGA, J.
There is no clear proof that respondent was instructed by petitioner to submit himself to an investigation. Neither is there proof that the letters supposedly sent by petitioner to respondent instructing him to report to work were ever received by respondent, or were ever sent in the first place. Further, assuming that the 8 February 1999 letter was indeed received by respondent, there is no reason for respondent to report to work. As this Court has held in one case, "for petitioner to anticipate respondent to report for work after the latter already filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC, would be absurd."[9]
2008-03-04
REYES, R.T., J.
Ordinarily, We would not touch this issue. The findings of facts of the CA are as a general rule, conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court.[48] Our power of review is limited to questions of law. It is well established that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re- examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.
2008-02-11
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Well-settled is the rule that it is the prerogative of the employer to transfer and reassign employees for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business.[13] An owner of a business enterprise is given considerable leeway in managing his business. Our law recognizes certain rights, collectively called management prerogative as inherent in the management of business enterprises. We have consistently recognized and upheld the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment, provided that there is no demotion in rank or diminution of his salary, benefits and other privileges[14] and the action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause.[15] This privilege is inherent in the right of employers to control and manage their enterprises effectively.[16]
2007-08-28
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, this Court is not a trier of facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances, it does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.[23] Factual matters are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.[24] In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. As held in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[25] factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive[26] on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court.[27] Absent any palpable error or arbitrariness, the findings of fact of the lower court are conclusive. On this ground alone, the appeal warrants a dismissal.
2007-08-28
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
At the outset, we must stress that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties considering that, as general rule, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.[13] We have likewise held that factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect, but even finality, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[14]
2007-03-01
TINGA, J.
There is constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it would foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.[14] It exists where there is cessation of work because "continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay."[15] The factual milieu in this case is different. Thus, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals both ruled that the treatment accorded petitioner does not constitute constructive dismissal.
2005-08-08
TINGA, J.
To begin with, the determination of whether respondent had suffered prejudice is a factual issue.  It is an established rule that in the exercise of its power of review, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.  Moreover, in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court.[32] An exception to this rule is when the findings of fact a quo are conflicting,[33] as is in this case.
2005-07-08
TINGA, J.
To begin with, the determination of whether respondent had suffered prejudice is a factual issue. It is an established rule that in the exercise of its power of review, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court.[32] An exception to this rule is when the findings of fact a quo are conflicting,[33] as is in this case.
2004-12-17
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
Settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect, but even finality, and bind the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence.[12] The findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are amply supported by the required quantum of evidence, i.e., evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[13]