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DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. BONITA O. PEREZ

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 161074 2010-03-22	MANUEL T. DE GUIA v. PRESIDING JUDGE PERALTA, J.
In petitions for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner can raise only questions of law - the Supreme Court is not the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts.[17] A departure from the general rule may be warranted where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on record,[18] which we found not obtaining in this case.
	GR No. 149552 2010-03-10	GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION v. ERNESTO CASIO LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In general, in a "petition for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner can raise only questions of law - the Supreme Court is not the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. A departure from the general rule may be warranted where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court [or quasi-judicial agency, as the case may be], or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on record."[20]
	GR No. 184122 2010-01-20	BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ABAD, J.
In this case, although BPI failed to state the penalty charges in the disclosure statement, the promissory note that the Yus signed, on the same date as the disclosure statement, contained a penalty clause that said: "I/We jointly and severally, promise to further pay a late payment charge on any overdue amount herein at the rate of 3% per month." The promissory note is an acknowledgment of a debt and commitment to repay it on the date and under the conditions that the parties agreed on.[43] It is a valid contract absent proof of acts which might have vitiated consent.[44]
	GR NO. 169578 2006-11-30	TERESITA DIO v. ST. FERDINAND MEMORIAL PARK CALLEJO, SR., J.
A contract of adhesion, wherein one party imposes a readymade form of contract on the other, is not strictly against the law.[29] A contract of adhesion is as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.[30] Contrary to petitioner's contention, not every contract of adhesion is an invalid agreement. As we had the occasion to state in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Perez:[31]
	GR NO. 138703 2006-06-30	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA AZCUNA, J.
As correctly pointed out by PMO, the original loans alluded to by respondents had been refinanced and restructured in order to extend their maturity dates. Refinancing is an exchange of an old debt for a new debt, as by negotiating a different interest rate or term or by repaying the existing loan with money acquired from a new loan.[36] On the other hand, restructuring, as applied to a debt, implies not only a postponement of the maturity[37] but also a modification of the essential terms of the debt (e.g., conversion of debt into bonds or into equity,[38] or a change in or amendment of collateral security) in order to make the account of the debtor current.[39]
	GR NO. 138703 2006-06-30	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA AZCUNA, J.
In usurious loans, the entire obligation does not become void because of an agreement for usurious interest; the unpaid principal debt still stands and remains valid but the stipulation as to the interest is void. The debt is then considered to be without stipulation as to the interest. In the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest, the legal rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed.[65]