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LIBRADO M. CABRERA v. SANDIGANBAYAN

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 192591 2011-06-29	EFREN L. ALVAREZ v. PEOPLE VILLARAMA, JR., J.
That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[12]
	GR No. 188487 2011-02-14	VAN D. LUSPO v. PEOPLE NACHURA, J.
In Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan,[47] we explained that there are two ways for a public official to violate this provision in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. In that case, we enumerated the essential elements of the offense, viz.: The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;
	GR Nos. 170339 2010-03-09	ROLANDO E. SISON v. PEOPLE CORONA, J.
The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was not able to prove any undue injury to the government as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that there are two ways by which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be violated--the first, by causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or the second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense,[22] an accused may be charged under either mode or both.[23] The use of the disjunctive "or" connotes that the two modes need not be present at the same time. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.[24]
	GR NO. 172602 2007-04-13	HENRY T. GO v. FIFTH DIVISION CALLEJO, SR., J.
An accused, like petitioner Go, may file a motion to quash the Information under Section 3(a) of Rule 117 on the grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In such a case, the fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the Information are not to be considered.[26]
	GR NO. 164664 2006-07-20	CARLOS C. FUENTES v. SANDIGANBAYAN CALLEJO, SR., J.
For the respondents to be criminally liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the injury sustained by petitioner must have been caused by positive or passive acts of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.[46] Since the State Auditors even recommended that respondents should not pay petitioner's claims due to irregularities in the transactions and the patent nullity of the same, it cannot be said that the "injury" claimed to have been sustained by petitioner was caused by any of respondents' overt acts.
	GR No. 164865 2005-11-11	ROBERTO P. FUENTES v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN CALLEJO, SR., J.
The Court agrees with the Special Prosecutor. The element of "undue injury" in violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was extensively discussed in Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan,[45] to wit:We find the contention of the petitioners to be untenable. For one thing, we have reviewed the rulings of the Court in Mendoza-Arce and kindred cases and find that the issue of whether or not violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 may be committed only by causing undue injury to the government or to a private individual, the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference being only a mode of causing undue injury to the government or to a private party had not been raised therein, nor resolved by the Court. In any event, the ruling in this case has categorized any perceived inconsistencies spawned by the rulings of the Court in Mendoza-Arce and other cases and those in Jacinto, Santiago, Evangelista, Quibal and Bautista.
	GR NO. 160991 2005-02-28	PACIFICO C. VELASCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN CALLEJO, SR., J.
In Librada M. Cabrera, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,[9] this Court held that the essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 are as follows: The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;