This case has been cited 9 times or more.
|
2016-01-27 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| Relief from judgment is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom a decision or order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.[27] This remedy is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy provided by law or the rules.[28] Generally, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to the negligence of his counsel[29] because of the time-honored principle that clients are bound by the mistakes and negligence of their counsel.[30] | |||||
|
2008-11-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| In this case, respondent's failure to avail herself of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the CA was due to her inexcusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[27] We note that a copy of the July 7, 1999 DARAB Decision was in fact served on the respondent herself at her residence, based on her narration that when she arrived from the U.S.A., her helper handed to her the envelope containing the DARAB Decision.[28] By her own account, she arrived on September 10, 1999. She cannot, therefore, feign ignorance of the said decision and blame the death of her counsel for such ignorance. | |||||
|
2007-08-24 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| It is long established by jurisprudence that the reglementary period is reckoned from the time the party's counsel receives notice of the decision, for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3, Rule 38.[12] Thus, while the failure of a party's counsel to notify him of an adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom constitutes inexcusable negligence, it is not a ground for relief from judgment.[13] | |||||
|
2007-04-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Moreover, under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment is subject only to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. In seeking to reverse the appellate court's decision denying their petition for relief from judgment by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy twice.[11] | |||||
|
2006-09-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| x x x x Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[23] | |||||
|
2006-08-22 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Thus, in Azucena v. Foreign Manpower Services,[7] it was held:Neither may petitioner seek to set aside the Court of Appeals' April 26, 2001 Resolution denying his petition for relief from judgment through the same mode of review (petition for review on certiorari), for under Section 1(b) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment is subject only to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
|
2006-08-22 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| It is undisputed that the counsel of record of petitioner is the Siguion Reyna law firm. The law firm failed to notify petitioner of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals to enable it to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal from the said decision. The law firm's failure to inform petitioner of the decision is inexcusable negligence which cannot be a ground for relief from judgment. This is in line with jurisprudence that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform his client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of right to appeal will not justify the setting aside of a judgment that is valid and regular on its face.[10] | |||||
|
2006-06-16 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| The Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers to adopt a system whereby they can always receive promptly judicial notices and pleadings intended for them.[24] Apparently, petitioner's counsel was not only remiss in complying with this admonition but he also failed to check periodically, as an act of prudence and diligence, the status of the pending case before the CTA Second Division. The fact that counsel allegedly had not renewed the employment of his secretary, thereby making the latter no longer attentive or focused on her work, did not relieve him of his responsibilities to his client. It is a problem personal to him which should not in any manner interfere with his professional commitments. | |||||
|
2006-01-20 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| [8] Azucena v. Foreign Manpower Services, G.R. No. 147955, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 346, 356. | |||||