This case has been cited 7 times or more.
2012-03-21 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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We held in People v. Valenzuela[46] that: Rape under paragraph 3 of [the above] article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation, and physical evidence of injury are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from good. (Emphasis ours.) | |||||
2010-11-24 |
BRION, J. |
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Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Hence, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from good.[22] | |||||
2010-09-01 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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We also agree with the ruling of the appellate court that appellant could be convicted of rape even without the medical certificate. "In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things."[44] As stated above, "AAA's" testimony was credible and convincing. As such, appellant's conviction could rest solely on it. The medical certificate would only serve as corroborative evidence. | |||||
2010-07-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place. The imposable indemnity is PhP 75,000 if the death penalty is imposed, and PhP 50,000 if the penalty is reclusion perpetua.[38] In Criminal Case No. 1256, the crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code when the offended party is under 12 years old, and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. We thus modify the award of PhP 75,000 to PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity | |||||
2010-03-05 |
BRION, J. |
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We cannot sustain the lower courts' convictions for the rapes committed in December 1997; first week of January 1998; first week of March 1998; and first week of June 1998. It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of innocence.[27] | |||||
2009-12-04 |
BRION, J. |
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Second, the prosecution established AAA's minority during the trial through the presentation of her birth certificate showing that she was born on July 21, 1983. AAA herself, in fact, testified regarding her age. Hence, when the appellant raped AAA on June 18, 1995 and on the first week of July 1995, she was not yet 12 years old. As we stated above, when the victim is below 12 years of age, violence or intimidation is not an element to be considered; the only subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge took place. The law conclusively presumes the absence of consent when the victim is below the age of 12. Thus, we held in People v. Valenzuela:[38] | |||||
2009-08-16 |
BRION, J. |
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What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation, and physical evidence of injury are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from good.[37] |