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AURORA TAMAYO v. PEOPLE

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 181973 2013-04-17	AMELIA AQUINO v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY PEREZ, J.
Anent the issue of refund, we note that petitioners were referring to the RATA received by the second category officials pursuant to PPA Memorandum Circular No. 36-89 dated 23 October 1989 and PPA Memorandum Circular No. 46-90 dated 14 November 1990. We deem it no longer necessary to discuss this issue considering that it was already ruled upon in the earlier PPA case and was even part of the dispositive portion[43] of the decision which became final and executory. Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect. It is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause therein should be laid to rest.[44] The arguments of petitioners regarding this issue should have been raised in that case and not in this present petition.
	GR No. 168382 2011-06-06	AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINES v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES DEL CASTILLO, J.
In the instant case, ALPAP seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to determine who among its members and officers actually participated in the illegal strike because, it insists, the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution did not make such determination. However, as correctly ruled by Sto. Tomas and Imson and affirmed by the CA, such proceeding would entail a reopening of a final judgment which could not be permitted by this Court. Settled in law is that once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable, thus can no longer be modified in any respect.[38] Subject to certain recognized exceptions,[39] the principle of immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed as "nothing further can be done except to execute it."[40]
	GR No. 167518 2011-03-23	BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. PIO ROQUE S. COQUIA DEL CASTILLO, J.
Clearly, then, this Court may not pass upon the same issues which had been finally adjudicated since a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the Supreme Court.[34] This principle of immutability of final judgment renders it unalterable as nothing further can be done except to execute it.[35] A judgment must be final at some definite time as it is only proper to allow the case to take its rest on grounds of public policy and sound practice.[36] Although there are recognized exceptions to this fundamental principle, such as nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments and cases which would not cause any prejudice to any party,[37] none of these exceptions obtain in the case at bench.
	GR No. 181930 2011-01-10	MILAGROS SALTING v. JOHN VELEZ NACHURA, J.
With the foregoing disquisition, we find that the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision had, indeed, become final and executory. A final and executory decision can only be annulled by a petition to annul the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or by a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to that effect was filed. [14] Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries. Nothing further can be done to a final judgment except to execute it. [15]
	GR No. 180988 2009-08-28	JULIE'S FRANCHISE CORPORATION v. CHANDLER O. RUIZ CARPIO, J.
Except to correct clerical errors,[14] a judgment which has acquired finality can no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct a perceived erroneous conclusion of fact or law.[15] There would be no end to litigation if parties are allowed to relitigate issues which were already resolved with finality.
	GR No. 162286 2009-06-05	GLEN PASCUAL Y MALUMAY v. PEOPLE PERALTA, J.
All of the above would lead anyone to conclude that petitioners were not vigilant. Although there is no doubt that petitioners' counsel was negligent, such negligence was not so gross because it still afforded petitioners the necessary remedy, provided that they themselves were not negligent. Hence, the negligence of their counsel binds them. A contrary view would be inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice. For all that a losing party would need to do is invoke the mistake or negligence of his counsel as a ground for reversing or setting aside a judgment adverse to him, thereby putting no end to litigation. To allow this obnoxious practice would be to put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by accused persons and their counsel, with a view to securing favorable rulings in cases of conviction.[30]