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GR No. 205728

2015-01-21

LEONEN, J.

Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court, whose power to review is "limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power."[23] Instead, respondents claim that the assailed notice and letter are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution[24] on COMELEC's power to decide all questions affecting elections.[25] Respondents invoke the cases of Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC,[26] Repol v. COMELEC,[27] Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC,[28] Blanco v. COMELEC,[29] and Cayetano v. COMELEC,[30] to illustrate how judicial intervention is limited to final decisions, orders, rulings and judgments of the COMELEC En Banc.[31]

GR No. 205728

2015-01-21

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC

LEONEN, J.

However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions to this general rule. Repol was another election protest case, involving the mayoralty elections in Pagsanghan, Samar.[36] This time, the case was brought to this court because the COMELEC First Division issued a status quo ante order against the Regional Trial Court executing its decision pending appeal.[37] This court's ponencia discussed the general rule enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it cannot take jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division.[38] However, consistent with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC,[39] it clarified the exception: This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[40]

GR No. 205728

2015-01-21

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC

LEONEN, J.

This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[40]

GR No. 193846

2011-04-12

MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO v. COMELEC

NACHURA, J.

Not unexpectedly, private respondent refutes the allegations of petitioner and raises the procedural infirmity in the instant petition, i.e., the power of this Court to review decisions of the COMELEC under Section 3,[4] Article IX-C of the Constitution, pursuant to the leading case of Repol v. COMELEC.[5] Private respondent likewise counters that the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion.

GR No. 182585

2009-11-27

JOSEPHINE MARMO v. MOISES O. ANACAY

BRION, J.

In law, the word "interlocutory" refers to intervening developments between the commencement of a suit and its complete termination; hence, it is a development that does not end the whole controversy.[26] An "interlocutory order" merely rules on an incidental issue and does not terminate or finally dispose of the case; it leaves something to be done before the case is finally decided on the merits.[27]

GR No. 181478

2009-07-15

EDDIE T. PANLILIO v. COMELEC

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

This issue has been squarely addressed in Repol v. COMELEC,[7] where the Court has declared that the remedy to assail an interlocutory order of the COMELEC in Division, which allegedly was issued with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction, is provided in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which pertinently reads: Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. -

GR No. 182374

2008-11-11

JEREMIAS V. ESTEVES v. RENE V. SARMIENTO

TINGA, J.

Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions, the requirement that an aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Division to the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the Supreme Court. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.[16]

GR No. 180164

2008-06-17

FLORENTINO P. BLANCO v. COMELEC

AZCUNA, J.

Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. Soriano v. COMELEC[4] and Repol v. COMELEC[5] gave the Court's interpretation of Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, thus:We have interpreted this constitutional provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. However, this rule is not ironclad. In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, we stated -

GR NO. 169008

2007-08-14

LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ

NACHURA, J.

Even if we allow the LBP's filing of the instant petition without any authority from the OGCC, we must still deny the same for we find no reversible error in the CA's ruling that LBP forum shopped. In Repol v. Commission on Elections,[22] we found forum shopping in the filing of a petition for certiorari during the pendency of an omnibus motion to reconsider, set aside and quash a writ of execution with the trial court. Likewise, in Go v. Judge Abrogar,[23] we deemed as a violation of the rules against forum shopping the institution of a separate action for annulment of auction sale with injunction, simultaneous with a third-party adverse claim and motion to quash writ of execution, and a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Further, in La Campana Development Corporation v. See,[24] we explained that the simultaneous filing of a motion to quash writ of execution and an action for the annulment of a judgment run afoul of the prohibition on forum shopping, thus:In essence, forum shopping is the practice of litigants resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. In determining whether forum shopping exists, it is important to consider the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by a person who asks appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the different courts or fora on the same issues. We have ruled that forum shopping is present when, in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

GR NOS. 164496-505

2007-04-02

ISIDORO L. SORIANO v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

In the 2004 case of Repol v. Commission on Elections,[12] the Court cited Ambil and held that this Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. However, the Court held that an exception to this rule applies where the commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. In Repol, what was assailed was a status quo ante Order without any time limit, and more than 20 days had lapsed since its issuance without the COMELEC First Division issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court held that the status quo ante Order of the COMELEC First Division was actually a temporary restraining order because it ordered Repol to cease and desist from assuming the position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the post in the meantime. Since the status quo ante Order, which was qualified by the phrase "until further orders from this Commission," had a lifespan of more than 20 days, this Order clearly violates the rule that a temporary restraining order has an effective period of only 20 days and automatically expires upon the COMELEC's denial of preliminary injunction. The Court held:Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc, thus:

GR NO. 168253

2007-03-16

MAYOR NOEL E. ROSAL v. COMELEC

CORONA, J.

Private respondent asserts, however, that Kho has been superseded by the more recent case of Repol v. Commission on Elections[15] from which he cites the dictum that:[t]he Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the action.[16]

GR NO. 166542

2006-07-25

NILO L. DOJILLO v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

We agree with petitioner that, as written, the Status Quo Ante Order raised more questions than it solved the legal problems of the case. The Status Quo Ante order had the nature of a temporary restraining order. We agree with petitioner that the Status Quo Ante Order had a life span of more than 20 days since the directive was qualified by the phrase "until further orders from this Commission." In line with Repol v. Commission on Elections,[27] the Status Quo Ante Order automatically ceased to have effect on 19 May 2003 since the COMELEC En Banc did not issue a writ of preliminary injunction.

GR NO. 164439

2006-01-23

JEFFREY L. SANTOS v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.[7] It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[8]

	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court, whose power to review is "limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power."[23] Instead, respondents claim that the assailed notice and letter are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution[24] on COMELEC's power to decide all questions affecting elections.[25] Respondents invoke the cases of Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC,[26] Repol v. COMELEC,[27] Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC,[28] Blanco v. COMELEC,[29] and Cayetano v. COMELEC,[30] to illustrate how judicial intervention is limited to final decisions, orders, rulings and judgments of the COMELEC En Banc.[31]
	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions to this general rule. Repol was another election protest case, involving the mayoralty elections in Pagsanghan, Samar.[36] This time, the case was brought to this court because the COMELEC First Division issued a status quo ante order against the Regional Trial Court executing its decision pending appeal.[37] This court's ponencia discussed the general rule enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it cannot take jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division.[38] However, consistent with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC,[39] it clarified the exception: This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[40]
	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[40]
	GR No. 193846 2011-04-12	MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO v. COMELEC NACHURA, J.
Not unexpectedly, private respondent refutes the allegations of petitioner and raises the procedural infirmity in the instant petition, i.e., the power of this Court to review decisions of the COMELEC under Section 3,[4] Article IX-C of the Constitution, pursuant to the leading case of Repol v. COMELEC.[5] Private respondent likewise counters that the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion.
	GR No. 182585 2009-11-27	JOSEPHINE MARMO v. MOISES O. ANACAY BRION, J.
In law, the word "interlocutory" refers to intervening developments between the commencement of a suit and its complete termination; hence, it is a development that does not end the whole controversy.[26] An "interlocutory order" merely rules on an incidental issue and does not terminate or finally dispose of the case; it leaves something to be done before the case is finally decided on the merits.[27]
	GR No. 181478 2009-07-15	EDDIE T. PANLILIO v. COMELEC LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
This issue has been squarely addressed in Repol v. COMELEC,[7] where the Court has declared that the remedy to assail an interlocutory order of the COMELEC in Division, which allegedly was issued with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction, is provided in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which pertinently reads: Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. -
	GR No. 182374 2008-11-11	JEREMIAS V. ESTEVES v. RENE V. SARMIENTO TINGA, J.
Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions, the requirement that an aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Division to the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the Supreme Court. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.[16]
	GR No. 180164 2008-06-17	FLORENTINO P. BLANCO v. COMELEC AZCUNA, J.
Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. Soriano v. COMELEC[4] and Repol v. COMELEC[5] gave the Court's interpretation of Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, thus:We have interpreted this constitutional provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. However, this rule is not ironclad. In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, we stated -
	GR NO. 169008 2007-08-14	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ NACHURA, J.
Even if we allow the LBP's filing of the instant petition without any authority from the OGCC, we must still deny the same for we find no reversible error in the CA's ruling that LBP forum shopped. In Repol v. Commission on Elections,[22] we found forum shopping in the filing of a petition for certiorari during the pendency of an omnibus motion to reconsider, set aside and quash a writ of execution with the trial court. Likewise, in Go v. Judge Abrogar,[23] we deemed as a violation of the rules against forum shopping the institution of a separate action for annulment of auction sale with injunction, simultaneous with a third-party adverse claim and motion to quash writ of execution, and a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Further, in La Campana Development Corporation v. See,[24] we explained that the simultaneous filing of a motion to quash writ of execution and an action for the annulment of a judgment run afoul of the prohibition on forum shopping, thus:In essence, forum shopping is the practice of litigants resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable judgment. In determining whether forum shopping exists, it is important to consider the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by a person who asks appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the different courts or fora on the same issues. We have ruled that forum shopping is present when, in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
	GR NOS. 164496-505 2007-04-02	ISIDORO L. SORIANO v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
In the 2004 case of Repol v. Commission on Elections,[12] the Court cited Ambil and held that this Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. However, the Court held that an exception to this rule applies where the commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. In Repol, what was assailed was a status quo ante Order without any time limit, and more than 20 days had lapsed since its issuance without the COMELEC First Division issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court held that the status quo ante Order of the COMELEC First Division was actually a temporary restraining order because it ordered Repol to cease and desist from assuming the position of municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the post in the meantime. Since the status quo ante Order, which was qualified by the phrase "until further orders from this Commission," had a lifespan of more than 20 days, this Order clearly violates the rule that a temporary restraining order has an effective period of only 20 days and automatically expires upon the COMELEC's denial of preliminary injunction. The Court held:Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc, thus:
	GR NO. 168253 2007-03-16	MAYOR NOEL E. ROSAL v. COMELEC CORONA, J.
Private respondent asserts, however, that Kho has been superseded by the more recent case of Repol v. Commission on Elections[15] from which he cites the dictum that:[t]he Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the action.[16]
	GR NO. 166542 2006-07-25	NILO L. DOJILLO v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
We agree with petitioner that, as written, the Status Quo Ante Order raised more questions than it solved the legal problems of the case. The Status Quo Ante order had the nature of a temporary restraining order. We agree with petitioner that the Status Quo Ante Order had a life span of more than 20 days since the directive was qualified by the phrase "until further orders from this Commission." In line with Repol v. Commission on Elections,[27] the Status Quo Ante Order automatically ceased to have effect on 19 May 2003 since the COMELEC En Banc did not issue a writ of preliminary injunction.
	GR NO. 164439 2006-01-23	JEFFREY L. SANTOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.[7] It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[8]

NOEL Y. REPOL v. COMELEC