This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2007-09-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Concededly, inscription of an adverse claim serves as a warning to third parties dealing with a piece of real property that someone claims an interest therein or that there is a right superior to that of the titled owner.[54] However, as pointed out by petitioners and as admitted by AZNAR, the Notice of Adverse Claim was annotated on TCT No. 20626 only on February 4, 1990, after the lost certificate of title was reconstituted and after the issuance of said TCT in the name of Go Kim Chuan on December 1, 1989. It is, therefore, absurd to say that Go Kim Chuan should be bound by | |||||
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2007-03-22 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Moreover, an inquiry into this issue necessitates a review of factual and evidentiary matters which is proscribed in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules.[16] | |||||
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2006-11-30 |
CALLEJO. SR., J. |
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| Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a virtual defiance of the court.[27] The power of contempt, being a drastic and extraordinary remedy, should not be exercised unless clearly necessary in the interest of justice.[28] In another case,[29] counsel likewise filed a motion for voluntary inhibition of the judge alleging, inter alia, that he feels that he has no chance of winning the case against the plaintiff in whose favor respondent has previously rendered a favorable judgment, and that respondent may no longer possess the cold neutrality of a judge to be able to render an impartial judgment. In the said case, the Court held: xxx The mere fact that respondent did not see any validity in the grounds given in the motion for his voluntary inhibition does not render the movants liable for direct contempt. It may be true that the contents of the motion were critical of respondent's prior actuations and expressed concern regarding his impartiality. Ang and Atty. Lapak may have insulted respondent. This, however, cannot be considered derogatory, offensive, or malicious as to undermine the integrity and dignity of the court and hamper the administration of justice.[30] A judge may not hold a party in contempt for expressing concern on his impartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein.[31] Moreover, a judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.[32] The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[33] | |||||
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2006-08-28 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.[10] Not one of the well-recognized exceptions to this rule on conclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain in this case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioner's plea for a review of the CA's findings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial demand for support had been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as here, is generally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the rule that the Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below,[11] except when, as earlier indicated, compelling reasons demand a review of the factual conclusions drawn from such evidence. | |||||