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DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ v. JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

2013-03-12
SERENO, C.J.
Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without petitioners' permission, we cannot grant the privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a trespass on their ampalaya farm. Granting that the intrusion occurred, it was merely a violation of petitioners' property rights. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[30] we ruled that the writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature, as follows: [T]he writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.[31]
2012-11-13
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings.[36]  It plays the preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of the perpetrators.[37]  In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[38] the Court has previously held that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty.  Hence, every petition for the issuance of the writ is required to be supported by justifying allegations of fact on the following matters: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
2010-09-07
PEREZ, J.
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a person's right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights--which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.[119]  Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,[120] which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
2010-07-05
BRION, J.
At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalack's favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to "extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."[3] The present case involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature - concerns that we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.[4] In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[5] we held: To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
2009-12-03
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[13] the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on the writ of amparo as follows: To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
2009-11-25
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Apropos is the Court's ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:[16]
2009-08-04
NACHURA, J.
The argument is sadly misplaced. Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[10] There is forum shopping where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[11] It is expressly prohibited by this Court because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct contempt.[12]