This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2011-01-19 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| We are inclined to accord due weight and respect to the ruling of the lower courts in giving credence to the positive testimonies of Nimfa and Jepson, both pointing to appellant as one of the kidnappers. Both witnesses testified in a clear and categorical manner, unfazed by efforts of the defense to discredit them. As a rule, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, which had a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.[52] While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial, as in this case, cannot render a valid and just decision, since the latter can very well rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision.[53] | |||||
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2009-08-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Appellant failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in its assailed Decision. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. However, we held that for such a defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. In this case, as correctly held by the CA, based on the evidence on record, appellant had the chance to escape Lumbayan's threat or engage Lumbayan in combat, as appellant was also holding a knife at the time. Thus, appellant's allegation of fear or duress is untenable. We have held that in order for the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat.[11] Therefore, under the circumstances, appellant's alleged fear, arising from the threat of Lumbayan, would not suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability. | |||||
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2007-11-21 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Actual damages may be awarded representing the amount of ransom paid. In People v. Morales[14] and People v. Ejandra,[15] the Court awarded actual damages representing the amounts of the ransom paid. In the instant case, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the award of P50,000.00 as actual damages, which is equivalent to the amount of the ransom paid. The heirs of the victim are also entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. In People v. Yambot,[16] the Court awarded civil indemnity of P50,000.00 after finding the accused guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom aside from ordering the return of the amount of the ransom. In addition, the heirs of the victim are also entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. In People v. Baldogo[17] and People v. Garcia,[18] the Court affirmed the awards of moral damages in the amounts of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively, predicated on the fact that the victims suffered serious anxiety and fright when they were kidnapped. | |||||