This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-08-24 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| True, it is a fundamental rule that contracts, once perfected, bind both contracting parties and a contract freely entered into should be respected since a contract is the law between the parties.[91] However, it must be understood that contracts are not the only source of law that govern the rights and obligations between parties. More specifically, no contractual stipulation may contradict law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.[92] | |||||
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2007-06-22 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| The magnitude of the non-representation by the OSG is nowhere more apparent than in the case at bar. Instead of having been represented by an "official learned in the law" who will "promote and protect the public weal" taking into consideration the "vast concerns of the sovereign which it is committed to serve," respondent state college was instead represented by a private lawyer who made no move to protect its interests except to file a motion to dismiss the complaint filed against the state college, which was eventually denied by the trial court. No answer to the complaint was filed notwithstanding due receipt of the order directing its filing, as a consequence of which the state college was declared in default. The order of default itself was not reconsidered, no move whatsoever having been made in that direction. The plaintiff was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. When the decision was rendered adjudging the state college and its co-defendant, Julian A. Alvarez, liable to the plaintiff, no effort was made to appeal the decision notwithstanding due receipt of a copy thereof by Atty. Aggabao on March 6, 2001. Thus, a writ of execution was issued against the properties of the state college, which by this time remained as the sole defendant, Julian A. Alvarez having died during the pendency of the case and no proper substitution of parties having been made at the instance of Atty. Aggabao. Clear, therefore, was the utter failure of justice insofar as respondent state college is concerned. It was as if it was not represented by counsel at all. While it may be argued that the officials of respondent state college should have informed the OSG of the suit filed against the state college, and that it was their fault or negligence that the OSG was not informed in the first place, it is settled, however, that the principle of estoppel does not operate against the government for the act of its agents or their inaction.[31] The State has to protect its interests and cannot be bound by, or estopped by the mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents, much more, non-suited as a result thereof.[32] The legality of legal representation can be raised and questioned at any stage of the proceedings.[33] | |||||
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2006-11-30 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Basic is the principle that contracts, once perfected, bind both contracting parties.[25] The parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. It follows that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.[26] | |||||
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2005-02-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As to petitioner's invocation of equity, we cannot, at this instance, yield to such principle in the presence of a law clearly applicable to the case. We reiterate that this Court, while aware of its equity jurisdiction, is first and foremost, a court of law.[23] While equity might tilt on the side of one party, the same cannot be enforced so as to overrule positive provisions of law in favor of the other.[24] Equity cannot supplant or contravene the law.[25] The rule must stand no matter how harsh it may seem. Dura lex sed lex. | |||||
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2005-01-31 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| The Joint Motion to Suspend filed by the accused and the respondent ombudsman cannot be deemed an admission on the part of the latter with respect to the so-called primordial legal issue involved in both cases. Much less can the filing thereof amount to double jeopardy. As discussed above, the Court has already noted the required elements of both crimes. However, petitioner has failed to show that these elements are identical, or that one offense necessarily includes or is in fact included in the others. Furthermore, estoppel arising from the act of agents of the government does not operate against the latter.[14] | |||||