Lawyerly

GR No. 195477

2016-01-15

SPS. HERMINIO E. ERORITA AND EDITHA C. ERORITA v. SPS. LIGAYA DUMLAO AND ANTONIO DUMLAO

BRION, J.

In Figueroa v. People,[15] we ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is not sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to apply.[16] Laches refers to the "negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."[17]

GR No. 188832

2014-04-23

VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA v. FIFTH SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

LEONEN, J.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong."[36] This power is conferred by law,[37] which may either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes.[38] If a court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are void.[39]

GR No. 188832

2014-04-23

VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA v. FIFTH SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

LEONEN, J.

In Figueroa,[75] this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be applied with great care;"[76] otherwise, the doctrine "may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice":[77]

GR No. 199595

2014-04-02

PHILIPPINE WOMAN’S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION v. TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND

REYES, J.

It has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by the plaintiff's allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.[30] Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy.[31]

GR No. 189833

2014-02-05

PEOPLE v. JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO

PEREZ, J.

Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[19]

GR No. 164258

2012-08-22

ESTRELLA TAGLAY v. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY

PERALTA, J.

It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void.[24] Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the RTC.

GR No. 179488

2012-04-23

COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING v. KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY

PERALTA, J.

Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[29]

GR No. 162322

2012-03-14

REPUBLIC v. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

SERENO, J.

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court's jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him"[22] is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower court's jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People,[24] we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.

GR No. 170251

2011-06-01

CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA v. EMELITA BERNARDO

PERALTA, J.

Respondents' allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[18] The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.[19]

GR No. 170251

2011-06-01

CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA v. EMELITA BERNARDO

PERALTA, J.

The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar that would justify the application of estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she appealed the case to the CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. Therefore, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no laches will even attach because the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.[23]

GR No. 153690

2011-02-15

DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816, February 28, 1967; Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966. And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a "rescission" being a counterpart, so to speak, of "specific performance". In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts of first instance would have to make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court, arising from issues like those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967 (the legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and the determination of the validity of the money deposit made); De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a mortgage); Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of the parties, the right to support created by the relation, etc., in actions for support), De Rivera, et al. v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation -- a prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.[23] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

GR No. 173021

2010-10-20

DELFIN LAMSIS v. MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E

DEL CASTILLO, J.

An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[79] the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the court's lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."[80] Wisely, some cases[81] have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.

GR No. 181969

2009-10-02

ROMLAGO v. SIEMENS BUILDING TECHNOLOGIES

NACHURA, J.

We had emphasized in Figueroa v. People[40] and recently in Apolonia Banayad Frianela v. Servillano Banayad, Jr.[41] that estoppel by laches supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. It is, therefore, too late in the day for ROMAGO to repudiate the jurisdiction of PDRCI over the dispute, and consequently, of the RTC to confirm the decision.

GR No. 169700

2009-07-30

APOLONIA BANAYAD FRIANELA v. SERVILLANO BANAYAD

NACHURA, J.

Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises's estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings.[18] The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu proprio by the courts.[19] Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[20]

GR No. 177960

2009-01-29

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP v. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG

TINGA, J.

Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[26] When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.[27] Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.

GR No. 177960

2009-01-29

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP v. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG

TINGA, J.

Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[26] When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.[27] Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.

GR No. 171678

2008-12-10

ROSA J. SALES v. WILLIAM BARRO

QUISUMBING, J.

It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.[25] The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of action or subject matter of the case.[26] In any event, even if respondent did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case. In this sense, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction may even be ordered by the court motu proprio.[27]

	GR No. 195477 2016-01-15	SPS. HERMINIO E. ERORITA AND EDITHA C. ERORITA v. SPS. LIGAYA DUMLAO AND ANTONIO DUMLAO BRION, J.
In Figueroa v. People,[15] we ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is not sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to apply.[16] Laches refers to the "negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."[17]
	GR No. 188832 2014-04-23	VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA v. FIFTH SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT LEONEN, J.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong."[36] This power is conferred by law,[37] which may either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes.[38] If a court hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are void.[39]
	GR No. 188832 2014-04-23	VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA v. FIFTH SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT LEONEN, J.
In Figueroa,[75] this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be applied with great care;"[76] otherwise, the doctrine "may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice":[77]
	GR No. 199595 2014-04-02	PHILIPPINE WOMAN’S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION v. TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND REYES, J.
It has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by the plaintiff's allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.[30] Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy.[31]
	GR No. 189833 2014-02-05	PEOPLE v. JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO PEREZ, J.
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[19]
	GR No. 164258 2012-08-22	ESTRELLA TAGLAY v. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY PERALTA, J.
It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void.[24] Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the RTC.
	GR No. 179488 2012-04-23	COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING v. KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY PERALTA, J.
Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[29]
	GR No. 162322 2012-03-14	REPUBLIC v. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION SERENO, J.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court's jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him"[22] is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower court's jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People,[24] we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.
	GR No. 170251 2011-06-01	CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA v. EMELITA BERNARDO PERALTA, J.
Respondents' allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[18] The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.[19]
	GR No. 170251 2011-06-01	CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA v. EMELITA BERNARDO PERALTA, J.
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar that would justify the application of estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she appealed the case to the CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. Therefore, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no laches will even attach because the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.[23]
	GR No. 153690 2011-02-15	DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM CARPIO MORALES, J.
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816, February 28, 1967; Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966. And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a "rescission" being a counterpart, so to speak, of "specific performance". In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts of first instance would have to make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court, arising from issues like those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967 (the legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and the determination of the validity of the money deposit made); De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a mortgage); Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of the parties, the right to support created by the relation, etc., in actions for support), De Rivera, et al. v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation -- a prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.[23] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
	GR No. 173021 2010-10-20	DELFIN LAMSIS v. MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E DEL CASTILLO, J.
An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[79] the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the court's lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."[80] Wisely, some cases[81] have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
	GR No. 181969 2009-10-02	ROMLAGO v. SIEMENS BUILDING TECHNOLOGIES NACHURA, J.
We had emphasized in Figueroa v. People[40] and recently in Apolonia Banayad Frianela v. Servillano Banayad, Jr.[41] that estoppel by laches supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. It is, therefore, too late in the day for ROMAGO to repudiate the jurisdiction of PDRCI over the dispute, and consequently, of the RTC to confirm the decision.
	GR No. 169700 2009-07-30	APOLONIA BANAYAD FRIANELA v. SERVILLANO BANAYAD NACHURA, J.
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises's estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings.[18] The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu proprio by the courts.[19] Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[20]
	GR No. 177960 2009-01-29	JEFFREY RESO DAYAP v. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG TINGA, J.
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[26] When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.[27] Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.
	GR No. 177960 2009-01-29	JEFFREY RESO DAYAP v. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG TINGA, J.
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[26] When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.[27] Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.
	GR No. 171678 2008-12-10	ROSA J. SALES v. WILLIAM BARRO QUISUMBING, J.
It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.[25] The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of action or subject matter of the case.[26] In any event, even if respondent did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case. In this sense, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction may even be ordered by the court motu proprio.[27]

VENANCIO FIGUEROA Y CERVANTES v. PEOPLE