This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2009-01-20 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| We affirm with modifications. The Court notes that the basis of the trial and the appellate courts in convicting the appellant of three counts of murder is circumstantial evidence, given the absence of any direct evidence as to who actually killed the victims. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that, for the same to be sufficient for conviction, there must be more than one circumstance; the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[20] A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the defendants are guilty, to the exclusion of any other conclusion.[21] The circumstances proved must be concordant with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that of guilt. As a corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence.[22] | |||||
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2008-09-19 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. As a corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence.[23] (Underscoring supplied) In the case at bar, the trial court based its conviction of appellant on the following circumstances as indicated in its decision:x x x 1] Cruz bought the spare parts sometime on or before the third week of August, 1993 and [they] were kept in the storeroom; 2] In August, 1993, Torres sought the help of Castro to look for spare parts for a 0.9 liter engine; 3] The list of spare parts that Torres asked Castro to look for corresponded to some spare parts for 0.9 liter engine that were earlier bought by Cruz; 4] Inso received the spare part from Castro in the third week of August 1993, 5] In that same month, Inso delivered the spare parts to [Rosita], 6] In September 1993, [Rosita] negotiated with Castro about the cost of the spare parts; 7] In December 1993, Cruz discovered missing parts from his storerooms, that corresponded with the spare parts that Castro delivered to Inso and which [Rosita] negotiated for the price with Castro; and 8] Castro is the only holder of the keys, aside from Cruz, of the storeroom of the shop, which is also proof positive that Castro enjoyed the trust and confidence of his employer, Cruz.[24] To the trial court, the foregoing circumstances were convincingly proven by the prosecution, whereas it found appellant to have failed to show proof "that the spare parts that Inso and Torres took from his residence which were delivered . . . [to Rosita], came from the 0.9 liter engine owned by Boleyley."[25] | |||||