Lawyerly

GR No. 155227-28

2011-02-09

EMILIANA G. PEÑA v. SPS. ARMANDO TOLENTINO AND LETICIA TOLENTINO

BERSAMIN, J.

Indeed, the settled rule in this jurisdiction, according to Mon v. Court of Appeals,[34] is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. This rule affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid.[35] The legal theory under which the controversy was heard and decided in the trial court should be the same theory under which the review on appeal is conducted. Otherwise, prejudice will result to the adverse party. We stress that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[36] This would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.[37]

GR No. 161387

2009-03-13

SPS. ADRIANO AND NORMA SIOSON and SPS. ARNIEL AND EDITH SIOSON v. VS.

CARPIO, J.

We agree with petitioners. Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue.[16] It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and must be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried.[17] The courts, in rendering decisions, ought to limit themselves to the issues presented by the parties in their pleadings.[18] A judgment that goes outside of the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid.[19] The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.[20]

GR No. 174873

2008-08-26

QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA v. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The Court notes with disfavor the sudden change in the theory by petitioner Quasha Law Office. Consistent with discussions in the preceding paragraphs, Quasha Law Office initially asserted itself as co-administrator of the estate before the courts. The records do not belie this fact. Petitioner Quasha Law Office later on denied it was substituted in the place of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate only upon filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, and then again before this Court. As a general rule, a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal.[26] When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[27] Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage.[28]

GR No. 172146

2008-07-30

CORNES v. LEAL REALTY CENTRUM CO.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In resolving the question of tenancy, it must be borne in mind that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not is basically a question of fact.[29] The general rule is, a question of fact is beyond the office of this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions of law may be raised.[30] It is settled doctrine that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court.[31] Such factual findings shall not be disturbed, unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[32]

GR No. 164912

2008-06-18

PAG-ASA FISHPOND CORPORATION v. BERNARDO JIMENEZ

REYES, R.T., J.

Verily, the DARAB finding of agricultural leasehold tenancy relations between petitioner's civil law lessee David Jimenez and respondents have no basis in law. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that for tenancy relations to exist, the following requisites must concur: (a) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; (b) the subject is agricultural land; (c) there is consent; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; and (e) there is consideration.[28]

GR No. 168766

2008-05-22

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. HENRY A. SOJOR

REYES, R.T., J.

The CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline. It declared that the enactment of R.A. No. 9299[23] in 2004, which converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the BOT of the power to discipline and remove its faculty members, administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was appointed as president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292.[24] The power of the BOT to remove and discipline erring employees, faculty members, and administrative officials as expressly provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is also granted to the BOR of NORSU under Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299. The said provision reads:Power and Duties of Governing Boards. - The governing board shall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines:

GR NO. 159593

2006-10-16

CIR v. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. In the more recent case of Mon v. Court of Appeals,[15] this Court again pronounced that, in this jurisdiction, the settled rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. It affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.

GR NO. 166781

2006-09-05

ALEJANDRO MORAGA v. SPS. JULIAN AND FELICIDAD SOMO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

While the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70051, limited itself to the issue presented by petitioner, the contrary happened in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, when the Court of Appeals fell into the same pitfall as the DARAB in fiddling with the issue of security of tenure. This conduct of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895 cannot be countenanced. First, it goes against the tenet that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue."[14] A judgment that goes outside the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid.[15] This norm does not only apply to courts but also to quasi- judicial bodies such as the DARAB.[16] Prescinding from this rule, the DARAB ruling on security of tenure, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, is therefore irrregular and invalid. From this disquisition, it is readily clear that the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895 is valid only insofar as it ruled that petitioner can no longer exercise his right to redeem the said property. Res judicata is not applicable because CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, in effect, has no ruling on the issue of security of tenure which CA-G.R. SP No. 70051 could have modified.

GR No. 145568

2005-11-17

HEIRS OF ENRIQUE TAN v. PROMULGATED: REYNALDA POLLESCAS

CARPIO, J.

On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code[21] abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system.[22] On 10 September 1971, Republic Act No. 6389 ("RA 6389") amending RA 3844 ("RA 3844 as amended") declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy.[23] RA 6389 did not entirely repeal Republic Act No. 1199[24] and RA 3844 even if RA 6389 substantially modified them.[25] Subsequently, Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 ("RA 6657") took effect on 15 June 1988. RA 6657 only expressly repealed Section 35 of RA 3844 as amended.[26] Thus, RA 6657 is the prevailing law in this case. The harvests in dispute are for the years 1992-1993 or after the effectivity of RA 6657.

GR NO. 147266

2005-09-30

LUDO v. VICENTE C. BARRETO AS SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

From the foregoing definition, the essential requisites[20] of tenancy relationship are: the parties are the landholder and the tenant;

	GR No. 155227-28 2011-02-09	EMILIANA G. PEÑA v. SPS. ARMANDO TOLENTINO AND LETICIA TOLENTINO BERSAMIN, J.
Indeed, the settled rule in this jurisdiction, according to Mon v. Court of Appeals,[34] is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. This rule affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid.[35] The legal theory under which the controversy was heard and decided in the trial court should be the same theory under which the review on appeal is conducted. Otherwise, prejudice will result to the adverse party. We stress that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[36] This would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.[37]
	GR No. 161387 2009-03-13	SPS. ADRIANO AND NORMA SIOSON and SPS. ARNIEL AND EDITH SIOSON v. VS. CARPIO, J.
We agree with petitioners. Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue.[16] It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and must be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried.[17] The courts, in rendering decisions, ought to limit themselves to the issues presented by the parties in their pleadings.[18] A judgment that goes outside of the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid.[19] The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.[20]
	GR No. 174873 2008-08-26	QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA v. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The Court notes with disfavor the sudden change in the theory by petitioner Quasha Law Office. Consistent with discussions in the preceding paragraphs, Quasha Law Office initially asserted itself as co-administrator of the estate before the courts. The records do not belie this fact. Petitioner Quasha Law Office later on denied it was substituted in the place of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate only upon filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, and then again before this Court. As a general rule, a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal.[26] When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[27] Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage.[28]
	GR No. 172146 2008-07-30	CORNES v. LEAL REALTY CENTRUM CO. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In resolving the question of tenancy, it must be borne in mind that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not is basically a question of fact.[29] The general rule is, a question of fact is beyond the office of this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions of law may be raised.[30] It is settled doctrine that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court.[31] Such factual findings shall not be disturbed, unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[32]
	GR No. 164912 2008-06-18	PAG-ASA FISHPOND CORPORATION v. BERNARDO JIMENEZ REYES, R.T., J.
Verily, the DARAB finding of agricultural leasehold tenancy relations between petitioner's civil law lessee David Jimenez and respondents have no basis in law. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that for tenancy relations to exist, the following requisites must concur: (a) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; (b) the subject is agricultural land; (c) there is consent; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; and (e) there is consideration.[28]
	GR No. 168766 2008-05-22	CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. HENRY A. SOJOR REYES, R.T., J.
The CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline. It declared that the enactment of R.A. No. 9299[23] in 2004, which converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the BOT of the power to discipline and remove its faculty members, administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was appointed as president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292.[24] The power of the BOT to remove and discipline erring employees, faculty members, and administrative officials as expressly provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is also granted to the BOR of NORSU under Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299. The said provision reads:Power and Duties of Governing Boards. - The governing board shall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines:
	GR NO. 159593 2006-10-16	CIR v. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. In the more recent case of Mon v. Court of Appeals,[15] this Court again pronounced that, in this jurisdiction, the settled rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. It affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.
	GR NO. 166781 2006-09-05	ALEJANDRO MORAGA v. SPS. JULIAN AND FELICIDAD SOMO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
While the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70051, limited itself to the issue presented by petitioner, the contrary happened in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, when the Court of Appeals fell into the same pitfall as the DARAB in fiddling with the issue of security of tenure. This conduct of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895 cannot be countenanced. First, it goes against the tenet that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue."[14] A judgment that goes outside the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid.[15] This norm does not only apply to courts but also to quasi- judicial bodies such as the DARAB.[16] Prescinding from this rule, the DARAB ruling on security of tenure, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, is therefore irrregular and invalid. From this disquisition, it is readily clear that the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895 is valid only insofar as it ruled that petitioner can no longer exercise his right to redeem the said property. Res judicata is not applicable because CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, in effect, has no ruling on the issue of security of tenure which CA-G.R. SP No. 70051 could have modified.
	GR No. 145568 2005-11-17	HEIRS OF ENRIQUE TAN v. PROMULGATED: REYNALDA POLLESCAS CARPIO, J.
On 8 August 1963, RA 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code[21] abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system.[22] On 10 September 1971, Republic Act No. 6389 ("RA 6389") amending RA 3844 ("RA 3844 as amended") declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy.[23] RA 6389 did not entirely repeal Republic Act No. 1199[24] and RA 3844 even if RA 6389 substantially modified them.[25] Subsequently, Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 ("RA 6657") took effect on 15 June 1988. RA 6657 only expressly repealed Section 35 of RA 3844 as amended.[26] Thus, RA 6657 is the prevailing law in this case. The harvests in dispute are for the years 1992-1993 or after the effectivity of RA 6657.
	GR NO. 147266 2005-09-30	LUDO v. VICENTE C. BARRETO AS SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
From the foregoing definition, the essential requisites[20] of tenancy relationship are: the parties are the landholder and the tenant;

HENRY L. MON v. CA