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ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 213455 2015-08-11	JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. PEOPLE BRION, J.
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence – as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense – do not need to be alleged. Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined based on the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.[36]
	GR No. 205357 2014-09-02	GMA NETWORK v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
The authority of the COMELEC to impose airtime limits directly flows from the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006 [2001])[32] one hundred (120) minutes of television advertisement and one-hundred eighty (180) minutes for radio advertisement. For the 2004 elections, the respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 6520[33] implementing the airtime limits by applying said limitation on a per station basis.[34] Such manner of determining airtime limits was likewise adopted for the 2007 elections, through Resolution No. 7767.[35] In the 2010 elections, under Resolution No. 8758,[36] the same was again adopted. But for the 2013 elections, the COMELEC, through Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, chose to aggregate the total broadcast time among the different broadcast media, thus: Section 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of Election Propaganda through Mass Media. All parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space for their election propaganda during the campaign period subject to the following requirements and/or limitations:
	GR No. 169004 2010-09-15	PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN PERALTA, J.
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[22] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[23] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics supplied.)[24]
	GR No. 169364 2009-09-18	PEOPLE v. EVANGELINE SITON Y SACIL YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[13] the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set out by the Courts; and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in the exercise of its police power.
	GR No. 167304 2009-08-25	PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN PERALTA, J.
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[21] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[22] The intention of the lawmakers î º who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers î º to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.[23]
	GR No. 166510 2009-04-29	PEOPLE v. BENJAMIN 'KOKOY' ROMUALDEZ TINGA, J.
Our 2004 ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan[10] cannot be cited against the position of private respondent's. The Sandiganbayan in that case denied the Motion to Quash filed based on prescription, and so it was incumbent on petitioner therein to file an appropriate remedial action to reverse that ruling and cause the quashal of the information. Herein, even as the Sandiganbayan disagreed with the prescription argument, it nonetheless granted the Motion to Quash, and it would be ridiculous for the petitioner to object to such action.
	GR No. 157584 2009-04-02	CONGRESSMAN GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY BRION, J.
Lis Mota - the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review - means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined.[30] This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; [31] to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.
	GR No. 167011 2008-04-30	SPS. CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ v. COMELEC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration Record does not automatically cancel the registration records. The fact remains that at the time of application for registration as new voter of the herein Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City was still valid and subsisting.[18] On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez[19] for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez[20] for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183, respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against petitioners.[21]
	GR NO. 171396 2006-05-03	PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt,[42] later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman.[43] The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.